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CHAPTER I
THE INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I
THE INTRODUCTION

The tenure laws have played an important role in the
employment of teachers in the public schools of the Common¬
wealth of Massachusetts from the time of the enactment of
the first tenure law in 1886 up to the present day.

The

history of those sections of the General Laws of Massa¬
chusetts which comprise the laws regarding tenure indicate
clearly the growing importance of these laws throughout the
decades.

There is no question concerning the fact that present

day teachers are more secure in their positions than were
the teachers of the past.

The trend of society in recent

years has been to protect the positions of its civil servants
and the teachers who belong to this group have fared better
than some groups and not as well as some others.
This problem is devoted to an attempt to determine to
as thorough a degree as is possible the amount of protection
which the laws pertaining to tenure offer to one employed
as a teacher, supervisor, principal, and superintendent in
the public schools of Massachusetts.
One may well ask:

”What protection do the laws of

Massachusetts give to me as a teacher in the public schools
of the state In regard to the permanency of my position?”
A question so general In nature may be answered most adequately

3

by breaking it down into a series of more specific questions
and attempting to answer them in the light of legislative
enactments, legal opinions, and court decisions involving
cases which have arisen concerning the laws applying to
tenure.

Such a procedure is followed here.

The chapters which make up this study have been written
to answer the following questions:
1. What does the word ”tenure” mean?
2. What is the purpose of the tenure laws?
3. What laws deal with tenure?
4. Who are protected by the tenure laws?
5. Under what conditions may a teacher serving on
tenure be dismissed?
6. Are such conditions always essential to the dis¬
missal of a teacher?
7. What degree of power is invested in the school
committee regarding tenure and dismissal of
teachers?
8. Is it possible for a teacher who has been dis¬
missed by a school committee to be reinstated?
9. Is it possible for the laws relating to tenure
of teachers to be rendered ineffective?
10. What procedure should a teacher follow who is
about to be dismissed?
11 . To whom should a teacher present his grievance
if he has been dismissed?
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12.

Is it possible for a school committee to re¬
duce a teacher1s salary in an attempt to force
his resignation?

It is hoped that the answers to these questions will in¬
dicate the degree of protection which the laws applying to
tenure offer to a teacher, supervisor, principal, and super¬
intendent serving in the employ of the public schools of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and thus provide an answer
to the problem.

v
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HISTORY OP THE TENURE LAWS

CHAPTER II
HISTORY OP THE TENURE LAWS

An examination of the General Laws of the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts indicates that four sections of chapter 71,
1

namely sections 41, 42, 43, and 63, apply to the tenure of
teachers, supervisors, principals and superintendents in the
employ of the public schools of Massachusetts.
In carrying out the purpose of this study to determine
the degree of protection which these laws offer the abovementioned group it will be necessary to examine these laws
as they originally existed along with the changes which have
brought them to their present form.

This chapter is devoted

to the history of these laws.
Before going back Into this legislative history, it will
be beneficial to possess a clear meaning of the word "tenure”
and of Its purpose.
Meaning of the Word "Tenure” — "Tenure” is defined as "the
term of holding office."

It Is a status to which teachers,

supervisors, principals and superintendents attain upon ful¬
filling the conditions of the tenure statute.
Purpose of Tenure — The purpose of a tenure statute has been
declared to be the promotion of "good order and the welfare
of the state and of the school system by preventing the re-

Devlin, Joseph, Webster* s New Standard Dictionary, The
World Syndicate Publishing Company, p. 936.
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moval of capable and experienced teachers at the political
2
or personal whim of changing office holders,”
Original Tenure Law — The first legislative enactment by
the General Court of Massachusetts which applied to the
tenure of teachers was Statute 1886, chapter 313 entitled
"An Act Relating to the Tenure of Office of Teachers" and
is stated as follows:

"The school committee of any city or

town may elect any duly qualified person to serve as a teacher
in the public schools of such city or town during the
pleasure or such committee provided,

such person has served

as a teacher in the public schools of such city or town for
a period of not less than one year."
Previous to the above enactment, an act was passed by
the Massachusetts General Court in 1844 entitled "An Act
Concerning the Powers of School Committee."

This act did

not specify the word "tenure" in its phraseology but did
affect the employment of teachers because of the powers of
dismissal of teachers which it gave the school committee.
This statute said:

"The school committee of any town is

hereby authorized to dismiss from employment any teacher in
such town, whenever the said committee may think proper, and
from the time of such dismissal such teacher shall receive
no further compensation rendered in that capacity."

2 01Keefe, William J., "Teachers and Their Legal Rights",
Educational Law Series Number 1, p. 45.

T

jar/ * i

—*

iiinTr-

mT

-ftsism*-!

tx
-r

fa?/’7Wi Sr?
gc;irrrl>
4A» L'fe

mi

XX '^vin^zn

Hj

tC

CP
1

JL gang^LanarrttgrrC

■m "Tif Sa* aciirrX

9

mlttee shall suffer no decrease In salary with¬
out his consent, until at least one year after
the school committee has voted to reduce his
salary.
Section 4.
Nothing herein contained shall
be construed as limiting the right of a school
committee to suspend a teacher or superintendent
for immoral conduct or other conduct unbecoming
a teacher; and if the teacher or superintendent
so suspended is subsequently dismissed because
of such conduct, he shall not receive any salary
for the period of his suspension.
Section 5.
Nothing herein contained shall
be construed as limiting the right of a school
committee to dismiss a teacher when an actual
decrease in the number of pupils in the schools
of the city or town renders such action ad¬
visable.
Section 6.
All acts and parts of acts in¬
consistent herewith are hereby repealed.
Section 7.
This act shall not apply to
superintendents of superintendency unions.
Section 8.
This act shall not apply to the
City of Boston.
Changes in Law through 1914 — Important changes are noted in
the 1914 act over those of 1844 and 1886.

Primarily, Statute

1914 compelled school committees to employ teachers at dis¬
cretion if these teachers were appointed again after having
served for the three previous consecutive years in the same
system.

The 1914 act includes superintendents when mention¬

ing rights of tenure, whereas no mention was made of this
group in the act of 1886.

The latest act altered the condi¬

tions for dismissal of teachers and superintendents as laid
down in the act of 1844 by requiring a two-thirds vote of
the whole committee; a thirty days notice of intention of the
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committee to vote on dismissal; a statement of reasons for
proposed dismissal if the teacher or superintendent so re¬
quests; a recommendation, in the case of a teacher, from
the superintendent to the committee as to the proposed dis¬
missal.
It may also he noted here that section 3 of Statute
1914 offered certain protection for teachers and superin¬
tendents from decreases in salary.

Nothing of this nature

can be found in any previous laws.

Furthermore, superin¬

tendents of superintendency unions were specifically ex¬
cluded from the provisions of Statute 1914.

Finally, the

latter act excluded the City of Boston from its embrace.
Statute 1918 — An act of 1918, chapter 257, section 182,
amended section 7 of chapter 714 of the acts of 1914 by add¬
ing at the end thereof the words "or districts."
Section Forty-one — In 1920 the above mentioned acts were
combined into sections 41, 42, and 43 of chapter 71 through
a consolidation and arrangement of the General Laws of
Massachusetts.

Section 41 remained unchanged from 1920

through the Tercentenary Edition of the General Laws in 1932
to the present time and is quoted here:

"Every school com¬

mittee, except in Boston, in electing a teacher or superin¬
tendent, who has served in its public schools for the three
previous consecutive school years, other than a union or
district superintendent, shall employ him to serve at its
discretion; but any school committee may elect a teacher who
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has served In its schools for not less than one school year
to serve at such discretion.”
Section Forty-two — Section 42 was altered by Statute 1921,
chapter 293 entitled "An Act Relative to the Dismissal of
Public School Teachers and Superintendents."

It said:

"Section 42 of chapter 71 of the General Laws is hereby
amended by inserting after the word proposed*
line the following:

*.

.

In the tenth

. nor unless, if he so requests,

he has been given a hearing before the school committee, at
which he may be accompanied by a witness.1"

This alteration

is self-explanatory.
With the above change, section 42 remained intact from
1921 through the Tercentenary Edition of the General Laws
(1932) and is here quoted:
The school committee may dismiss any teacher,
but in every town except Boston no teacher or
superintendent, other than a union or district
superintendent, shall be dismissed unless by a
two-thirds vote of the whole committee.
In
every such town a teacher or superintendent em¬
ployed at discretion under the preceding section
shall not be dismissed unless at least thirty
days prior to the meeting, exclusive of customary
vacation periods, at which the vote Is to be
taken, he shall have been notified of such in¬
tended vote, nor unless. If he so requests, he
shall have been given a statement by the com¬
mittee of the reasons for which his dismissal
is proposed; nor unless, if he so requests, he
has been given a hearing before the school com¬
mittee, at which he may be accompanied by a
witness; nor unless, in the case of a teacher,
the superintendent shall have given the com¬
mittee his recommendations thereon.
Neither
this nor the preceding section shall affect the
right of the committee to suspend a teacher or
superintendent for unbecoming conduct, or to
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dismiss a teacher whenever an actual decrease
in the number of pupils in the schools of the
town renders such action advisable.
No
teacher or superintendent who has been law¬
fully dismissed shall receive compensation for
services rendered thereafter, or for any period
of the lawful suspension followed by dismissal.
An Act of 1954 — An act of 1934, chapter 123, entitled "An
Act Relative to the Dismissal of Public School Teachers and
Superintendents" is worded as follows:
Chapter 71 of the General Laws is hereby
amended by striking out section 42 as appear¬
ing in the Tercentenary Edition thereof and
inserting in place thereof the following:
’The school committee may dismiss any teacher,
but in every town except Boston no teacher
or superintendent, other than a union or dis¬
trict superintendent, shall be dismissed unless
by a two-thirds vote of the whole committee.
In every such town a teacher or superintendent
employed at discretion under the preceding
section shall not be dismissed, except for in¬
efficiency, incapacity, conduct unbecoming a
teacher or superintendent, insubordination or
other good cause, nor unless at least thirty
days, exclusive of customary vacation periods,
prior to the meeting at which the vote is to
be taken, he shall have been notified of such
intended vote; nor unless, if he so requests,
he shall have been furnished by the committee
with a written charge or charges of the cause
or causes for which his dismissal is proposed;
nor unless, if he so requests, he has been
given a hearing before the school committee
which may be either public or private at the
discretion of the school committee and at
which he may be represented by counsel, present
evidence and call witnesses to testify in his
behalf and examine them; nor unless the charge
or charges shall have been substentiated; nor
unless, in the case of a teacher, the superin¬
tendent shall have given the committee his
recommendations thereon. Neither this nor the
preceding section shall affect the right of a
committee to suspend a teacher or superintendent
for unbecoming conduct, or to dismiss a teacher
whenever an actual decrease in the number of

15

. pupils in the schools of the town renders
such action advisable.
No teacher who has
been lawfully dismissed shall receive com¬
pensation for services rendered thereafter,
or for any period of lawful suspension
followed by dismissal.
Effect of 1954 Revision of Section Forty-two — The revision
of section 42 by the act of 1954 inserted into the law the
exception as to dismissal for inefficiency, incapacity, con¬
duct unbecoming a teacher, or other good cause.

It also

added the provision applying upon substantiation of the
charges, and changed to a certain extent the procedure relat¬
ing to the hearing.
Formerly there was no requirement that the charges
against a teacher be ”substantiated” in a proceeding before
the school committee in the nature of a judicial investiga¬
tion.

Prior to 1954 no judicial investigation was required

as a prerequisite to removal.

The committee in good faith

could, by the requisite majority, dismiss a superintendent
or teacher without legal cause.®
Section Forty-two A — Section 42 was broadened again by an
act of 1945,

chapter 550, entitled ”An Act Giving Certain

Rights to School Principals and Supervisors in Cases of De¬
motion.”

It reads:

Chapter seventy-one of the General Laws is
hereby amended by inserting after section fortytwo, as amended, the following section: f. . .

See Graves vs. School Committee of Wellesley, 299 Mass.
80.
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Section 42A* No principal or supervisor who
has served in that position for over three
years shall, without his consent, be demoted
for inefficiency, incapacity, unbecoming con¬
duct, insubordination or other good cause;
nor unless, at least thirty days, exclusive of
customary vacation periods, prior to the meet¬
ing at which the vote is to be taken, he shall
have been notified of such intended vote; nor
unless, if he so requests, he shall have been
furnished by the committee with a written
charge or charges of the cause or causes for
which his demotion is proposed; nor unless, if
he so requests, he has been given a hearing
before the school committee, which may be
either public or private at the discretion of
the school committee, and at which he may be
represented by counsel, present evidence and
call witnesses to testify in his behalf and
examine them; nor unless the superintendent
shall have given the committee his recommen¬
dations thereon*f
In short, section 42A gives the same degree of protection
from demotion to principals and supervisors as section 42
gives to teachers and superintendents from dismissal.
House Bill 565 — At the present time there is a bill await¬
ing hearing before the Massachusetts General Court which, if
passed, will further amend section 42.

It is the 1946 House

Bill number 365, entitled ”An Act to Give Preference to
Teachers Serving on Tenure When It Is Necessary to Reduce the
Number of Teachers in a School Department because of a De¬
crease in the Number of Pupils.”

It reads:

Section forty-two.of chapter seventy-one of
the General Laws (Tercentenary Edition), as
most recently amended by chapter one hundred
and twenty-three of the acts of nineteen
hundred and thirty-four, is hereby further
amended by adding the following sentence at
the end thereof; *• . .In case a decrease in
the number of pupils in the schools of a town
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renders advisable the dismissal of one or
more of the teachers, a teacher who is
serving at the discretion of a school com¬
mittee under the terms of section forty-one
of this chapter shall not be dismissed if
there is a teacher not serving at discretion
whose position the teacher serving at dis¬
cretion is qualified to fill.1
Section Forty-three — The rearrangement of the General Laws
of Massachusetts in 1920 made section 3 of chapter 714 of
the Acts of 1914 into section 43 of chapter 71.

This

section remained unchanged through the Tercentenary Edition
of the General Lav/s (1932) to the present.

Section 43 is

quoted here:
The salary of no teacher employed in any
town except Boston to serve at discretion
shall be reduced without his consent except
by a general salary revision affecting
equally all teachers of the same salary grade
in the town.
The salary of no superintendent
so employed shall be reduced without his con¬
sent until at least one year after the com¬
mittee has so voted.
Origin of Section Sixty-three — The history ^f the present
section 63 must be treated separately from the sections whose
history has been discussed above because its origin differs
from that of the other laws with which we are concerned.
The first mention in statutes concerning the employment
of a union superintendent may be found in Statute 1870,
chapter 183, sections 1 and 2, entitled "An Act Authorizing
Towns to Unite in the Election of Superintendents."
Section 1.
Any two or more towns may, by
a vote of each, form a district for the pur¬
pose of employing a superintendent of public
. schools therein, who shall perform in each
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town the duties prescribed by law.
Section 2.
Such superintendent shall be
annually appointed by a joint committee com¬
posed of the chairman, the secretary of the
school committees of each town in said
district, who shall determine the relative
amount of service to be performed by him in
each town, fix his salary, and apportion
the amount thereof to be paid by the several
towns and certify the same to the treasurer
of each town.
Said joint committee shall,
for the purposes named in this section, be
held to be the agents of each town composing
the district aforesaid.
The above sections were incorporated in the Public
Statutes of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in 1882 as
sections 45, 44, and 45 of chapter 44.
Statutes of 1888, 1893, and 1898 dealt with school
unions but did not change the method of election nor the tern
of office of a union superintendent, said term being for one
year.
The Revised Laws of January, 1902, incorporated the
law concerning the employment of a superintendent of a
school union in sections 42 and 44 of chapter 42.
42 said:
Such superintendent shall be annually
appointed by a joint committee composed of
the chairman and secretary of the school
committee of each of the towns in said
district, who shall determine the relative
amount of service to be performed by him in
each town, fix his salary, apportion the
amount thereof to be paid by the several
towns and certify the same to each town
treasurer.
Section 44 said:
The school committee of such towns shall

Section
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be a joint committee, which for the purpose
of such union, shall be the agents of each
town therein.
The joint committee shall
anually, in April, meet at a day and place
agreed upon by the chairmen of the committees
of the several towns comprising the union,
and shall organize by the choice of a chair¬
man and a secretary.
They shall choose, by
ballot, a superintendent of schools, deter¬
mine the relative amount of service to be
performed by him in each town, fix his salary,
apportion the amount thereof to be paid by
the several towns and certify it to the
town treasurer.
Statute of 1911 -- The term of office of a superintendent
remained one year until the passage of Statute 1911,

chapter

384, entitled "An Act Relative to the Tenure of Office for
Superintendents of School Unions."

This act amended section

44 of chapter 42 of the Revised Laws by striking out from
said section the words "choose by ballot" and by adding at
the end of the section the words:
Such superintendent of schools shall be
employed for a term of three years, and his
salary shall not be reduced during such term.
Failure of a superintendent during his term
of office to receive a certificate as pro¬
vided by chapter two hundred and fifteen of
the year nineteen hundred and four, upon the
expiration of a prior certificate, shall there¬
by vacate his office.
He may be removed from
office by a two-thirds vote of the full member¬
ship of the joint committee, and with the
consent of the board of education to such dis¬
missal, whereupon his salary shall cease.
The above amendment fixed a union superintendents term
of office as three years, protected him from a reduction in
salary, required his certification, and provided the machinery
for his removal.
Section 43 was amended by Statute 1911, chapter 399.
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This amendment dealt with, the permanency of super intendency
unions hut did not change the conditions concerning the
employment of superintendents.
Statute of 1912 — Statute 1912, chapter 114, entitled "An
Act to Secure Equality of Representation of Towns on the
•

*

i

Joint Committee of a Superintendency Union" is stated in
part here because of its importance in the organization of
the group which employs a superintendent of a union and be¬
cause it forms part of section 63 of chapter 71 of the General
Laws (Tercentenary Edition):
Section forty-three of chapter forty-two of
the Revised Laws, as amended by chapter three
hundred and ninety-nine of the acts of the year
nineteen hundred and eleven, is hereby further
amended by striking out the word *which* in
the twelfth line, and inserting in place there¬
of the words:
’ . . . provided, that any school
committee consisting of more than three members
shall be represented on the joint committee by
its chairman and two members, chosen by said
committee ... *
An Act of 1945 — Parts of sections 42, 43, and 44 of the Re¬
vised Laws, as amended by the statutes of 1911 and 1912,
were combined to form section 63 of chapter 71 by the arrange¬
ment and consolidation of the General Laws in 1920.

Section

63 remained unchanged through the Tercentenary Edition of
1932 until amended by Statute 1945, chapter 223, sections 1
and 2, entitled "An Act Giving to Certain Superintendents of
Schools in Superintendency Unions the Tenure Benefits Granted
to Other School Superintendents."
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Section 1.
Section sixty-three of chapter
seventy-one of the General Laws, as appearing
in the Tercentenary Edition, is hereby amended
by adding at the end the following paragraph:
f. . . A superintendent in a union who has
served continuously in the same union for more
than three years and who has been employed at
least twice as superintendent in said union,
each for a term of three years, shall not be
removed except for inefficiency, incapacity,
conduct unbecoming a superintendent, insubor¬
dination or other good cause, nor without full
compliance with the provisions of section fortytwo, relative to teachers and other superin¬
tendents, as to notice of intention to dismiss,
specification of charges, hearing and sub¬
stantiation of charges.’
Section 2. Notwithstanding the provisions
of section one of this act, a superintendent
of a superintendency union in office on its
effective date shall not be entitled to the
benefits thereof except after he has been re¬
employed in said office.
The above amendment places a union superintendent under
the same rules for dismissal as any other superintendent and
gives him the opportunity to serve at discretion after
having been employed at least twice in a given union, each
for a term of three years.
Section Sixty-three — Section 63, as it now stands, is as
follows:
Section 1.
The school committees of such
towns ^""towns comprising union dlstricts_j7
shall, for the purposes of the union, be a
joint committee and shall be the agent of each
participating town, provided that any school
committee of more than three members shall be
represented therein by its chairman and two
of its members chosen by it.
The joint com¬
mittee shall annually, in April, meet at a day
and place agreed upon by the chairmen of the
constituent committees, and shall organize by
choosing a chairman and a secretary.
It shall
employ for a three-year term, a superintendent
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of schools, determine the relative amount of
service to be rendered by him in each town,
fix his salary, which shall not be reduced
during his term, apportion the payment there¬
of in accordance with section sixty-five among
the several towns and certify the respective
shares to the several town treasurers.
He may
be removed, with the consent of the department,
by a two-thirds vote of the full membership of
the joint committee.
A superintendent in a union who has served
continuously in the same union for more than
three years and who has been employed at least
twice as superintendent in said union, each
for a term of three years, shall not be removed
except for inefficiency, incapacity, conduct
unbecoming a superintendent, insubordination
or other good cause, nor without full compliance
with the provisions of section forty-two, rela¬
tive to teachers and other superintendents, as
to notice of intention to dismiss, specification
of charges, hearing and substantiation of
charges.
Section 2.
Notwithstanding the provisions
of section one of this act, a superintendent
of a superintendency union in office on its
effective date shall not be entitled to the
benefits thereof except after he has been re¬
employed in said office.
This chapter ha3 treated the history of the laws apply¬
ing to tenure from the first legislation concerning them up
to the present date, including the proposed legislation
which consists at present of 1946 House Bill 365.

Such a

history will be of value to the reader in connection with the
following chapters.

CHAPTER III
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AND OPINION OF
ATTORNEY GENERAL ON SECTION FORTY-ONE

CHAPTER III
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AND OPINION OP
ATTORNEY GENERAL ON SECTION FORTY-ONE

The Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts has handed down a considerable number of de¬
cisions on cases which have arisen from the three laws on
tenure of teachers, namely sections 41, 42, and 43 of
chapter 71 of the General Laws of Massachusetts, as well
as several decisions on cases which have arisen from the
law concerning the dismissal and tenure of superintendents
of school unions which is section 63 of the same chapter.
This phase of the study concerns itself with these decisions
as an aid to the formation of a conclusion as to the extent
to which the tenure laws offer protection to the public
school teachers and superintendents in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts.
There are two opinions of attorney generals of the
commonwealth which have been handed down on the tenure laws.
These opinions, while not binding in a court of law, are
of some value in indicating the reactions that these laws,
or the cases concerning them, have on the legal minds who
render decisions on our laws.
It seems only logical In presenting the Supreme Court
decisions and the opinions of the attorney generals on cases
arising from these laws to group them according to the law
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which provoked them.

Some of the decisions tie in with

more than one of the laws.

Where this situation occurs,

the case is repeated in the presentation.

It is with this

thought of sequence in mind that the information which
follows begins with the decisions arising from questions
on section 41 of chapter 71 of the General Laws and is
followed by the decisions on sections 42, 43, and 63 of the
same chapter.
Section Forty-one — It seems wise at this point to quote
section 41 of chapter 71 of the General Laws.

This law

says:
Every school committee, except in Boston,
in electing a teacher or superintendent, who
has served in the public schools for the
three previous consecutive school years, other
than a union or district superintendent, shall
employ him to serve at its discretion; but any
school committee may elect a teacher who has
served in its schools for not less than one
school year to serve at such discretion.
This law, like all others, has been put to many tests
during its lifetime.

Naturally, situations arise which are

not covered by the law.

These situations result in the de¬

cisions of the courts which are presented below.

A glance

at the above law makes one conscious of some of the more
obvious questions which have arisen in connection with it.
Following is a list of questions provoked by this law:
1. What were the conditions of employment prior to
the enactment of the law?
2. How inclusive is the power of the school com¬
mittee under this law?
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3. Does the law apply to teachers other than those on
tenure?
4. Must tenure be granted to a teacher who Is reappoint¬
ed after three consecutive years of service?
5. What is the legal meaning of the word "discretion”?
6. Does the law apply to part-time teachers?
The answers to the above questions are presented below follow¬
ing the Supreme Court decisions on the cases that resulted
from this law.
School Committee could Discharge a Teacher at any Time —
It was long the law that a school committee could discharge
a teacher at any time.

This was borne out In the decision

In the case of Knowles vs. City of Boston.4

This case was an

action of contract brought by Charlotte M. Knowles against
the City of Boston in the Supreme Judicial Court, to recover
salary as a teacher in a public school in Boston.
Miss Knowles was for several years an assistant teacher
In Boston, having been appointed annually and serving In that
capacity until she was notified by the school committee that
the school where she taught had been voted to be abolished
and that her services were no longer required.

She was dis¬

missed for no fault on her part.
As the plaintiff had been appointed for the school year
and had worked under said appointment for a few weeks before

4

Knowles vs. City of Boston, 78 (12 Gray) Mass. 339.
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being dismissed, she sued for salary for the first quarter
of the school year.

The defendants offered to be defaulted

for a proportional part of the salary to the time of the
plaintiff’s dismissal, and the parties submitted the case
to the decision of the Superior Court who gave judgment for
the plaintiff for the sum offered.

The plaintiff appealed

and the judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Gourt stated that the facts in the case
showed that the mode of selection of teachers by the city
was to make choice of them annually, and that they usually
continued in employment in pursuance of such election for the
ensuing year.

But such an employment, in the absence of ex¬

press stipulation, must be deemed to have been entered into
under the provisions of the statute, which gave the right to
the school committee to terminate it at any time.
Power of the School Committee Conferred in most General Terms
In the case of Pulvino vs. Yarmouth, the Supreme Court
elaborated on the power of the school committee.
Joseph Pulvino was employed as Supervisor of Music in the
superintendency union comprising the towns of Dennis, Yarmouth
and Brewster.

He was -under a single year’s contract begin'■

;r.

•

ning in the month of September, 1931 but was dismissed in
v.
I

December of that year because the superintendent reported dis¬
satisfaction with his work.

The case went before the Superior

Court in which a verdict was returned in favor of the defen¬
dants.

The plaintiff excepted and the Supreme Court upheld

the decision of the Superior Court.
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In upholding the decision of the Superior Court the
Supreme Court said:
It was suggested that the statute (Statute 1844,
chapter 32) which states that the school com¬
mittee of any town may dismiss from employment any
teacher whenever they may think proper, did not
intend to authorize the school committees to dis¬
miss teachers unless some fault or neglect was
committed by them in the performance of their
• duties.
But this Is altogether too narrow an in¬
terpretation of the above statute.
The power of
the school committee is conferred in the most
general terms, and it is to be exercised whenever
in the judgment of those to whom it is committed
the public good for any cause requires it.
Of
this they are the exclusive judges.5
Present Law Applies only to Teachers who are on Tenure — In
the Pulvino case the court pointed out that the changes made
by sections 41 and 42 in securing permanency of tenure and
requiring certain procedure for a valid discharge relate only
to teachers who are "on tenure”, and do not apply to one em¬
ployed for a single year.^
The Terms of Section Forty-one are Mandatory — This fact was
brought out in the case of Paquette vs. City of Fall River.7
Two teachers In the public schools of Fall River,
Lillian J. Paquette and Alvin A. Gaffney brought separate
actions against said city to recover a sum equivalent to the
twenty percent reduction that was voted by the school com¬
mittee for all teachers serving on tenure In Fall River.
*

O

r

Pulvino vs. Yarmouth, 286 Mass. 21.

6
Ibid.

7

Paquette vs. City of Fall River, 278 Mass. 172.
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The cases went to the Superior Court where they were
consolidated and a finding made for the defendant.

The

plaintiffs excepted and the case went to the Supreme Court
which upheld the decision of the Superior Court and stated
in part that nthe school committee has no option to elect
the teachers there described”
serve at its discretion,”

(in section 41) except ”to

The meaning of this statutory

language is that such discretion includes every essential
element in the service thus established save as otherwise
specified by statute.

In this connection the discretion of

the school committee denotes freedom to act according to
honest judgment.
Implication of the Term ”Dlscretlon” — In the Paquette vs.
Fall River case mentioned above the Supreme Court stated:
The term discretion* implies the absence
of a hard and fast rule.
The establishment of
a clearly defined rule of action would be the
end of discretion, and yet- discretion should
not be a word for arbitrary will or incon¬
siderate action. Discretion means a decision
of what is just and proper in the circumstances.8
The relation between teachers employed to
serve at the school committee*s discretion and
the city constitute a continuous and indetermi¬
nate service subject to the statutory provisions
and the exercise of discretion by the school
committee within the prescribed limits.
They
do not establish employment from year to year.9

® Paquette vs. Fall River, 278 Mass. 172.
9
Paquette vs. Fall River, 278 Mass. 172 citing Corrigan vs.
Fall River, 250 Mass. 330, 339.
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Three Year Period of this Statute cannot be Lengthened by
School Board — In a petition for a writ of mandamus,
filed in the Supreme Judicial Court without a decision from
the Superior Court, Marjorie J. Frye sought reinstatement
to her position as a teacher in the public high school of
Leicester.^
The issue depended on whether or not the petitioner
had attained the status of tenure.

The school committee

claimed that because her last election took place on
May 6, 1936, before the final expiration of her third con¬
secutive school year, she had not served "for the three pre¬
vious consecutive school years” as required by statute.
In ordering the petitioner reinstated to her position,
the court held that the clear purpose of section 41 is to
provide some degree of protection for the tenure of teachers
who have served a probationary term of three consecutive
school years and who are continued in employment thereafter,
and that doubtless its phraseology was influenced by the
practice of electing teachers during the period intervening
between the end of one school year and the beginning of the
next.

It could not have been intended that a school board

could in substance lengthen the three year period of the
statute into a four year period by holding its election of
teachers on the last day of a school year instead of the day

10

Frye vs. School Committee of Leicester, 300 Mass. 537.

29
following.
The Words “Has Served” and “Previous" do not Refer to the
Precise Time of Holding the New Election — In the case of
Prye vs. School Committee of Leicester mentioned above, the
court pointed out that the words "has served” and "previous”
refer to the time of the beginning of service under that
election, and the dominant words of the mandate, "shall
employ ... to serve at discretion."

Therefore, a teacher

must be deemed on tenure at discretion when he has actually
served three consecutive school years, and has been elected
for further service, even though the election takes place
before the expiration of the last three consecutive school
years.-*-1
"Part Time Teachers" are not under Separate Classification —
The Supreme Court further stated in the Prye case that
section 41 recognizes no separate classification of "part
time" teachers.

The sole test mentioned is "service for

three previous consecutive years.
School Teachers who are not Employed at Discretion Serve
only upon a Yearly Basis -- In an action of contract in¬
volving forty-one employees of the City of Woburn, the
plaintiffs, some of whom were school teachers including
Prank P. Callahan, sued the city for the balance of their
--

-

-

-

-

-

-

—

-

-

-

Frye vs. School Committee of Leicester, 300 Mass. 537.
12
Ibid.
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lawfully fixed salaries, unpaid because of insufficient
appropriations.

The Superior Court of Middlesex found in

favor of the plaintiffs.

The defendant, the City of

Woburn, alleged exceptions and the Supreme Judicial Court
sustained the exceptions in favor of the city.

In its

decision the Supreme Court stated that teachers who are not
employed at discretion, although not covered by the pro¬
visions of sections 41, 42, and 43 of chapter 71 of the
General Laws, are nevertheless under contract. ^
Making of Rules Determining Policy Weed not be by a TwoThirds Vote — This opinion was an outcome of the decision
of the Supreme Court in the case of Fernell B. Houghton vs.
the City of Somerville in which the petitioner filed for a
writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court, petitioning for re¬
instatement to her position as a teacher in the public schools
of Somerville.

The petitioner was dismissed after the school

committee voted to bar married women from teaching in the
school system.

The petitioner contended that the school

committee had gone beyond its constitutional power In making
this rule.
The Supreme Court In finding in favor of the respondent
(the City of Somerville) said in part that there was no re¬
quirement in section 41 that the making of rules determining
a question of policy shall be by a two-thirds vote, even

13

Callahan vs. Woburn, 306 Mass. 265.
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though the operation of such rules may almost inevitably
result in some dismissals
Rule Dismissing Married Teachers is Constitutional — In
the decision of the Houghton case stated above the Supreme
Court held that a rule adopted by the school committee
giving them the power to dismiss married school teachers was
not unconstitutional as impairing the obligation of contract
because the employment under this section is at "discretion”
and always subject to the policy making powers of the com¬
mittee.^
Dismissal of a Teacher or Superintendent must be in Con¬
formity with Section Forty-two — In the case of Graves vs.
the School Committee of Wellesley, in which S. Monroe Graves
petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus rein¬
stating him to his former position as Superintendent of Schools
In Wellesley, the Supreme Court stated in ordering his re¬
instatement that a superintendent holding his position under
the provisions of section forty-one of chapter 71 Is not
subject to dismissal except in conformity to section fortytwo of the same chapter.^
A Vote to Promote a Teacher on Tenure can be Revoked before
Effective Date — In the case at hand, McDevitt vs. Malden,

Houghton vs. School Committee of Somerville, 306 Mass.
542.
15
Ibid.
16
Graves vs. School Committee of Wellesley, 299 Mass. 80
(discussed more fully under section 42).
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John W. McDevitt petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ
of mandamus ordering the school committee of that city to
reinstate him to the position of principal of a combined
junior high school and elementary school at a salary higher
than he had been getting, a position to which he had been
\

elected by the school committee on December 17, 1935.
On January 6, 1936, after a city election had brought
about a change in the personnel of the school board, the new
board voted that ttthe Superintendent be instructed not to
recognize” the vote of December 17, ”inasmuch as it did not
conform with section 59 of chapter 71 of the General Laws of
Massachusetts and that the position be declared vacant.”
That section provides that superintendents of schools ’’shall
recommend to the committee teachers, textbooks, and courses
of study.”
The court, in ruling against the petitioner, stated that
the general managerial powers of the school committee con¬
tinued to exist after December 17, 1935.

Those powers in¬

cluded the power to change by a majority vote the duties of
teachers on tenure at discretion.

The court also stated

that the fact that a majority of the committee was mistaken
that the vote of December 17 was invalid because it had not
recommended the petitioner, that reason was not the dominating
reason for the vote of January 6, and that the petitioner was
not entitled to the increase in salary as it was not the in¬
tention of section 43 to protect a salary the right to which
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never became vested.
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Terms of Sections Forty-one and Forty-two may be Rendered
Ineffective — Following Is an opinion of an attorney
general concerning the effect which a change in the city
charter would have upon the tenure of office of teachers in
the City of Pittsfield:
Statute 1932, Chapter 280, section 37, deal¬
ing with a revision in the city charter, says as
far as is applicable:
*Said committee shall
appoint annually, but not of their own number,
a superintendent of schools and such other sub¬
ordinate officers, teachers and assistants,
including janitors of school buildings, as it
may seem necessary for the proper discharge of
its duties . . . .f
Said statute of 1932, chapter 280, section 37
provides in effect that teachers shall be appoint¬
ed only for terms not in excess of one year.
This provision is entirely inconsistent with the
terms of General Law, chapter 71, relative to
the election of teachers * to serve at its
/’"’the school committee * s_J/ discretion*, as the
quoted words are used in chapter 71, sections
41 and 42.
As used in said sections 41 and
42 the phrases * serve at its discretion*,
*to serve at discretion* and * employed at dis¬
cretion* connote employment not for a period
with a fixed and definite maximum length, but
for an indefinite period.
Hence the provisions
of said General Law, chapter 71, sections 41
and 42, with relation to the tenure of teachers
who are chosen to serve at discretion, have no
application to teachers who are appointed
annually, as those functioning under the newly
adopted charter of Pittsfield are to be.
In
other words, the terms of said section 41 and
at least the second sentence of section 42,
are rendered ineffective as to the teachers of
Pittsfield by the passage and adoption of said
Statute 1932, chapter 280, when it becomes fully
effective as described in its section 46.

17

McDevitt vs. School Committee of Malden, 298 Mass. 213
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Teachers have no vested interest in the
tenure of their offices that the same may not
be altered or destroyed by an act of the Legis¬
lature, so that teachers elected prior to the
passage of said chapter 280 will be in no
different case than others after the act be¬
comes effective in this respect.^-8
The citizens of Pittsfield hearkened to the opinion of
the attorney general in this instance as the act was not pre¬
sented on the ballot for ratification at the city election
until it had been amended by the legislative act of 1933,
chapter 231, section 4, which concerns itself with the em¬
ployment of teachers and is quoted herewith:
Section thirty-seven of chapter two hundred
and eighty of the acts of 1932 is hereby amended
by striking out the third paragraph and insert¬
ing in place thereof the following: • • . Said
committee shall annually elect one of its number
as chairman to serve in the absence of the
mayor, shall annually appoint one of its number
to attend the meetings of the city council and
shall annually appoint one of its number as
secretary, who shall be under its direction and
control.
Said committee shall elect teachers
and a superintendent of schools annually, ex¬
cept as provided by section forty-one of the
General Laws, and may dismiss or suspend such
teachers and superintendent, subject to sections
forty-two of said chapter seventy-one.19
Chapter 280 of the acts of 1932 as amended by chapter 231
of the acts of 1933 was ratified at the next city election
.p"

at Pittsfield.

^ Opinion of the Attorney General (1933), 28.
19
Mass. Statutes, 1933.
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Answers to Questions on Section Forty-one.
!• What were the conditions of employment prior to
the enactment of the law? — Prior to the enact¬
ment of the tenure law, a school committee could
discharge a teacher at any time.

.

2

How inclusive is the power of the school committee
under this law? — The power of the school com¬
mittee under this law is broad and ample and con¬
strued in the most general terms.

3..Does the law apply to teachers other than those on
tenure? — Section 41 applies only to teachers who
are on tenure and not to one employed for a single
year.
4. Must tenure be granted to a teacher who is reappointed
after three consecutive years of service? — Yes.
The three year period of this statute cannot be
lengthened by the school board.
5. What is the legal meaning of the term "discretion"? —
Discretion means a decision of what is just and proper
in the circumstances.
6. Does the law apply to "part time" teachers? —
Section 41 recognizes no separate classification of
"part time" teachers.

The sole test mentioned is

"service for three previous consecutive school years."

SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON SECTION FORTY-TWO

CHAPTER IV
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON SECTION FORTY-TWO

The same plan will be followed In the presentation of
the Supreme Court decisions applying to section 42 as was
followed with section 41.
Section Forty-two — The Important points of section 42 are
as follows:
The school committee may dismiss any teacher,
but in every town except Boston no teacher . . .
shall be dismissed unless by a two-thirds vote
of the whole committee. ... a teacher or super¬
intendent employed at discretion • . . shall not
be dismissed except for inefficiency. Incapacity,
conduct unbecoming a teacher or superintendent
• • . nor unless at least thirty days, . . .
prior to meeting at which vote is to be taken,
he shall have been notified of such intended
vote; nor unless, ... he shall have been fur¬
nished ... with a written charge or charges
of the cause or causes for which his dismissal
is proposed; nor unless, ... he has been given
a hearing before the school committee . . . and
at which he may be represented by counsel, present
evidence and call witnesses to testify in his
behalf and examine them; nor unless the charge
or charges have been substantiated; nor unless.
In the case of a teacher, the superintendent
shall have given the committee his recommendations
thereon.
Neither this nor the preceding section
shall affect the right of a committee to suspend
a teacher or superintendent for unbecoming con¬
duct, or to dismiss a teacher whenever an actual
decrease In the number of pupils • • • renders
such action advisable.
No teacher or superin¬
tendent who has been lawfully dismissed shall
receive compensation for services rendered there¬
after, or for any period of lawful suspension
followed by dismissal.
The Items of Importance in section 42A, the most recent
amendment to section 42, are:
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No principal or supervisor who has served
in that position for over three years shall
... he demoted for inefficiency . . .; nor
unless, at least thirty days . . . prior to
the meeting at which the vote is to be taken,
he shall have been notified of such intended
vote; nor unless, ... he shall have been
furnished by the committee with a written
charge or charges of the cause or causes for
which his demotion is proposed; nor unless,
... he has been given a public hearing be¬
fore the school committee, ... at which he
may be represented by counsel, present evi¬
dence and call witnesses to testify in his
behalf and examine them; nor unless the charge
or charges have been substantiated; nor unless
the superintendent shall have given the com¬
mittee his recommendations thereon.
It may be seen from inspection that section 42A is
phrased similar to section 42 in order to give the same pro¬
tection to principals and supervisors as is given to teachers
and superintendents.

This amendment is of such recent en¬

actment that no cases have been brought to the Supreme Court
for decisions concerning it.

The following decisions and

interpretations must of necessity be confined to section 42.
It must be borne in mind, however, that some of the decisions
following would be considerably different if section 42A had
been in effect.

It is also true that many of the decisions

are based upon the law as it existed in the past.
A study of section 42 brings out a considerable number
of questions which naturally arise in connection with this
statute, some of which are:
1. Must the school committee elaborate on specifica¬
tions for dismissal?
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2. Is the statutory power of a school committee
strictly or freely construed?
3. V^hat is the meaning of the terra "judicial inves¬
tigation” as it applies here?
4. What is the meaning of the word "substantiated" as
it applies here?
5. What teachers are covered by this section?
6. Does a vote of dismissal indicate that the charges
have been substantiated?
7. Must the school committee always act in the interest
of the schools?
8. Is the committee empowered to change duties of a
teacher on tenure?
9, May counsel appear for the committee?
10. Must recommendation of superintendent favor dis¬
missal?
11. What constitutes "good cause"?
12. Must a board member who Is prejudiced withdraw from
board during vote on dismissal?
13. Does the section afford any protection to a teacher
on tenure over one notion tenure if a dismissal is
required because of a decrease in enrolment?
The answers to the above questions are found following
the Supreme Court decisions which are presented below.
Provisions of Section Forty-two Indicate Purpose of General
Court to Cover Field of Relations between Teachers and
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Committees — The Supreme Court ruled In the case of
Paquette vs. Fall River that the provisions of sections 42
and 43 of chapter 71 indicate the purpose of the General
Court to cover the field of relations between teachers and
school committees and not leave operative general rules
arising from implications which would govern the rights be¬
tween independent parties.^0
Charges must be Substantiated — In an action of tort, pre¬
viously before the Supreme Court in 286 Mass. 440, Elizabeth
S. Caverno brought suit against the defendant Fellows,
Superintendent of Schools of the City of Gloucester, the de¬
fendant Johnson, principal of the high school of said city,
and the defendant Harris, Supervisor of English in said high
school, alleging malicious interference with the plaintiff1s
contract of employment as a teacher in said high school and
maliciously procuring her dismissal as such teacher by the
school committee of said city.
In the case previously before the Supreme Court, the
plaintiff alleged that the defendants ’’unlawfully and with¬
out justifiable cause did conspire to have said plaintiff
dismissed from her position as a school teacher .

.

.

The defendants demurred to the declarations on the grounds
that no particular charge was specified.

The Supreme Court

sustained the demurrer because there was no tort set out as

20 Paquette vs. Fall River, 278 Mass. 172 citing Lowell
vs. Lowell, 265 Mass. 353.
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to a single defendant.
Thereafter the declaration was amended to read "for
malicious interference .

.

."as stated above.

The case

went before a single justice of the Supreme Court who
ruled in favor of the defendants.

The plaintiff alleged

exceptions and the case went to the full court.

The full

court in overruling the exceptions stated that there was no
evidence that the conduct of any of the defendants was
actuated by ill will toward, or a purpose to harm, the
plaintiff, rather than by a justifiable purpose to perform
their respective duties; and that prior to 1934 there was
no requirement that the charges against a teacher be "sub¬
stantiated" in a proceeding before the school committee in
the nature of a judicial investigation.^
Judicial Investigation a Prerequisite to Removal — In a
petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the school com¬
mittee of Wellesley to reinstate him into the office of
Superintendent of Schools (Graves vs. Wellesley), S. Monroe
Graves claimed that the school committee offered no evidence
to substantiate the charges which included:

"Your failure

and apparent Inability to create and maintain the school
system as one continuous and consistent whole .

.

.

."

The Supreme Court, in sustaining the petition, stated

21 Caverno vs. Fellows, 300 Mass. 331.
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that before chapter 123 of the acts of 1934 was passed, no
Judicial investigation was required as a prerequisite to
removal.

The committee in good faith could, by the re¬

quisite majority, dismiss a superintendent of schools or a
teacher without any legal cause.

However, as the petitioner

was given a hearing at which no evidence was introduced in
support of the charges against him, mandamus will lie to
enforce compliance with General Law chapter 71, section 42,
as amended by Statute 1934, chapter 123, which requires sub¬
stantiation of charges and judicial investigation as pre¬
requisites to dismissal.^
Section Forty-two must be Compiled with — Teachers on
tenure at discretion cannot be dismissed from the teaching
force without compliance with this section.

This fact was

emphasized in the case of McDevitt vs. School Committee of
Malden which was mentioned previously with section 41.^®
Notification of Appointment of a Successor is not a Com¬
pliance — It was brought out in the case of Graves vs.
Wellesley, mentioned above, that a dismissal of a superin¬
tendent of schools employed by a town at discretion was not
in conformity with section 42 as amended by Statute 1934,
chapter 123, where the committee notified him that they had

Graves vs. School Committee of Wellesley, 299 Mass. 80.
23
McDevitt vs. School Committee of Malden, 298 Mass. 213.
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chosen his successor before even intimating to him that
they proposed to dismiss him.

Manifestly such action was

not in accordance with judicial investigation.24
School Committee not Required to Elaborate on Specifications
for Dismissal — A petition by Alice T. Corrigan (Corrigan
vs. New Bedford), the principal of a public school in New
Bedford for a writ of mandamus to compel the school com¬
mittee to furnish her full and complete specifications of the
reasons assigned by them for their contemplated action in
proceeding to vote upon her dismissal provoked the following
decision from the Supreme Court, after the petitioner took
exception to the decision of a single member who had dis¬
missed the petition.:

"Information given the principal of a

public school at her request by the school committee stating
that 'the committee's dissatisfaction with her work and the
belief that she has not demonstrated constructive leadership
and necessary administrative capability' was sufficient com¬
pliance with section 42 of chapter 71, as to statement of
reasons, and the school committee cannot be required to give
further specifications in response to the request.”

On this

ground the exception of the petitioner was overruled.2^
The Statutory Power of a School Committee to Discharge Teachers

^ Graves vs. School Committee of Wellesley, 299 Mass. 80.
25
Corrigan vs. School Committee of New Bedford, 250 Mass.
334.
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has always been Freely Construed -- This interpretation of
section 42 was brought out in the case of Davis vs. School
Committee of Somerville which resulted from a petition to
the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus by Hazel M. Davis
to restore her to active service as a teacher in the public
schools in the City of Somerville.
The petitioner, employed on tenure in Somerville prior
to her unrequested retirement by the school committee,
claimed failure on the part of the school committee to notify
the retirement board within five days after her dismissal
with a fair summary of the facts relating to her removal and
that her removal consequently became null and void.
The Supreme Court said, in dismissing the petition,
that one of the most important duties involved in the manage¬
ment of a school system is the choosing and keeping of proper
and competent teachers.

The success of a school system de¬

pends largely on the character and ability of the teachers.
Unless a school committee has authority to employ and dis¬
charge teachers it would be difficult to perform properly its
duty of managing a school system.

The statutory powers of

the school committee to discharge teachers has always been
freely construed.
Interpretation of Term wJudicial Investigation” and Word
"Substantiated” as They Apply to Section Forty-two — It was

26

Davis vs. School Committee of Somerville, 307 Mass.
334.
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brought out In the now familiar case of Graves vs. School
Committee of Wellesley that a hearing under General Law
(Tercentenary Edition) chapter 71, section 42, as amended
by Statute 1934, chapter 123 is in the nature of a judicial
investigation after preferment of charges and notice, and
the establishment of sufficient cause for dismissal by ade¬
quate evidence.

It was also stated that the word ”sub¬

stantiated” has been defined to mean ”to establish the existence or truth of, by true or competent evidence."

27

This Statute in Substance and Effect Requires a Hearing upon
Evidence — In Graves vs. School Committee of Wellesley the
Supreme Court in sustaining the petition pointed out that
disbelief of testimony of witnesses called by a superintendent
In his behalf Is not the equivalent of evidence in support
of the charges produced by the committee, and that nothing
can be treated as evidence which Is not introduced as such.
It further stated that the respondents (committee) called no
witnesses and offered no evidence and the petitioner did call
witnesses who were wholly favorable to the petitioner and
that disbelief of testimony of witnesses on the part of members
of the school committee Is not the same as evidence against
the petitioner.^

Graves vs. School Committee of Wellesley, 299 Mass. 80.
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Similarly, in Moran vs. School Committee of Little¬
ton which is discussed in detail further along in this
chapter, the Supreme Court brought out that a decision made
•

*■

by an administrative board after a hearing required in a
quasi-judicial proceeding is a nullity if based on evidence
known only to members of the board and not presented at the
hearing.^
Dismissal is not merely a Change In Assignment of Duties —
In Boody vs. School Committee of Barnstable, Louis M. Boody
petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to re¬
store him to the position of supervising principal of the
high and junior high schools.
Mr. Boody had served on tenure in the town of Barn¬
stable as a teacher and a principal for many years.

In 1929

the school committee of three members elected the petitioner
as a supervising principal of the high and junior high
schools.

He performed these duties until the spring of 1930

when the committee was increased In membership to five
members and In September 1930 the enlarged committee voted
to change Mr. Boody* s duties to those of a teacher in the high
school.

No change In salary was made and no notice of the

committee1s intended vote was received by the petitioner.
The case was heard by an auditor who ordered the petition
dismissed.

29

The -petitioner alleged exceptions.

In overruling

Moran vs. School Committee of Littleton, 317 Mass. 591*
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the exceptions the Supreme Court said that no limitation
is placed by this section on the power of a majority of
the school committee to change or lessen the duty assigned
to a teacher.
The court also said:

"The dismissal contemplated

under section 42 of chapter 71 of the General Laws is a
complete separation from the schools of the town; and it
is not a mere change in assignment of duties resulting in
lessened authority or scope of employment.

A principal is

a teacher who is entrusted with special duties of direction
and management.
School Committee Empowered to Change Duties of a Teacher
on Tenure — The Supreme Court mentioned in ruling on the
case of McDevitt vs. School Committee of Malden, in which
a teacher who had been promoted to a principalship of a
junior high school and demoted to a teacher before taking
over the duties of a principal attempted to be reinstated
as principal, that the general managerial powers of the
school committee include the power to change by a majority
vote the duties of teachers on tenure at discretion and to
assign them to new duties, or to continue them in their ex¬
isting duties, or to return them to duties already performed,
although such teachers cannot be dismissed from the teaching

Boody vs. School Committee of Barnstable, 276, Mass.
134.

force without compliance with section 42, chapter 71 of
the General laws.
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A Principal Assigned to Duty a3 a Grade School Teacher
is not "Dismissed" -- In the case of Downey vs. School
Committee of Lowell, the Supreme Court ruled that a prin¬
cipal of a grammar school who has been assigned as a teacher
in grammar school cannot come under the protection of
section 42 as regards dismissal, as such person has not
32
been dismissed.
Hearing is a Condition Precedent when Requested — A teacher,
P. Gladys Perkins, on tenure in the public schools of Quincy,
was notified that she was to be dismissed.

She requested a

hearing and specifications which were furnished.

At the

hearing on November 26, 1940, and after the close of the
evidence when arguments of counsel were heard, only five of
the seven members of the committee were in attendance.
On December 10, 1940, the entire committee of seven
members voted on her dismissal.

The vote was six for dis¬

missal and one member voted present.
Miss Perkins petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ
/

of mandamus commanding the respondents (the committee) to
restore her to her position.

The case was transferred to the

Superior Court, where the judge found the facts as stated in

McDevitt vs. School Committee of Malden, 298 Mass. 213
Downey vs. School Committee of Lowell, 3C5 Mass. 329.
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the auditor's report.

It then was reported to the Supreme

Court for determination.
The Supreme Court In rendering a decision in favor of
the petitioner said that it was essential that a quorum of
the committee he present at the hearing.

The requirements

for "a two-thirds vote of the whole committee" and for a hear¬
ing "before the school committee" necessarily imply that a
quorum of the committee for the purpose of such a hearing
must consist of not less than two-thirds of the whole com¬
mittee.®^
Participation in Hearing is Condition Precedent to Vote for
Dismissal — The following opinion was handed down in Perkins
vs. Quincy mentioned above.
Where a hearing is requested by a teacher,
such a hearing * before the school committee' of
the nature described in section 42 of chapter
71 of the General Laws as amended by Statute
1934, chapter 123, is a condition precedent to
dismissal of the teacher.
A member of a school committee who was not
present at a hearing held by the committee under
section 42 . . ., did not participate in the
hearing although thereafter he read the whole
stenographic report.
Therefore, the votes of
two members of a school committee who did not
participate in the hearing 'before the school
committee', could not be counted in the 'twothirds vote of the whole committee' required to
dismiss a teacher.
Section 42, as amended, in providing for a
hearing before the school committee at which the
teacher 'may be represented by counsel, present
evidence and call witnesses to testify in his
behalf and examine them* contemplates that each

33
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member of the committee who votes for dis¬
missal shall be in the favorable position
for decision of the matter that results from
hearing and seeing the witnesses.34
Vote to Dismiss is Vote that Charges have been Substan¬
tiated — Again in Perkins vs. School Committee of Quincy,
the Supreme Court pointed out that a ”two-thirds vote of
the whole committee’' to dismiss a teacher is, in substance,
a vote that the charge or charges against that teacher
have been ’’substantiated” by evidence introduced at the
hearing.

It is not a vote that as a matter of general

policy, irrespective of the evidence introduced at the hear¬
ing, the teacher should be dismissed.55
A Vote by a School Committee Member not Cast on Merits of
the Question is not Valid — In two petitions filed in the
Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus (Sweeney vs. School
Committee of Revere), the first was to direct the school
committee of Revere to reinstate Leroy E. Sweeney as principal
of the Junior high school and the second was to direct said
committee to reinstate the other petitioner, William F.
Pollard, as assistant principal of the senior high school,
both at their former salaries.
The school committee voted to consolidate the junior
and senior high schools and In so doing voted to retain

34

Ibid.

35
Ibid.

51

Sweeney and Pollard at lower salaries as teachers.

There

was no evidence of a superintendent's recommendation that
the positions should he abolished.

In the case of Pollard

the record clearly showed that the votes of two members of
the committee were actuated by feelings of political re¬
sentment.
The full court in sustaining Pollard's petition with
costs stated in part that the votes of the two committee
members who were known to have been actuated by ill-will
must be discounted and that therefore the vote dismissing
Pollard failed of the necessary two-thirds and the petition¬
er must be reinstated to his former position.
The court found the auditor's report to be as stated
in the case of Sweeney.

Consequently the votes of the two

members which were discounted in Pollard's case could not
be so treated here.

Furthermore, the court ruled that the

effect of this vote on the salary of Sweeney was not within
the scope of section 43 as he was the only person of his
class.

This petition was dismissed.5®

A Teacher who has not Received Required Notice cannot be
D1smlssed — In Sweeney vs. School Committee of Revere, the
Supreme Court stated further in respect to the other petition
er, Pollard:

36

Sweeney vs. School Committee of Revere, 249 Mass. 525.
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We do not consider that we are required to
allow such a hoard to nullify the plain and
salutory provisions of this statute by simply
covering their unlawful acts with a virtuous
name.
The committee, to whose attention
section 42 had been expressly called by one of
its members, could not do indirectly that which
it could not do directly.
Pollard could not
be dismissed as assistant principal of the high
school unless he received the customary thirty
days notice, as it was found that under the
consolidation, the administrative duties of
the principal of the combined schools would be
so increased that the position of assistant
principal at least would be as essential as it
was before such reorganization.37
But it was stated in Toothaker vs. School Committee of Rock¬
land, a case which is discussed below, that it was not
necessary under section 42 to give a superintendent of schools
notice that the committee was to vote on his dismissal at a
certain meeting.

This ruling was interpreted as dealing

with a specific meeting.

The superintendent had to be given

the customary notice, but the committee was not required to
specify the meeting at which the vote was to be taken.
Committee is Bound to Act for Welfare of Schools — In
Toothaker vs. Rockland, Oliver H. Toothaker petitioned the
Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the school
committee of the town of Rockland to reinstate him to his
former position as superintendent of schools.
The petitioner had been employed on tenure in his posi-

37

Ibid.
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Toothaker vs. School Committee of Rockland, 256 Mass.
584.
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tion.

The school committee of the town consisted of three

members, two of whom were not favorable to the petitioner.
The dismissal of the superintendent was the outstanding
issue of the town election campaign in the year 1925 when
one of the two committee members mentioned above was elected
to office.
On receiving notice of the committee’s intended action
to obtain his dismissal, the petitioner requested a hearing
and reasons for dismissal.

He was notified that the reasons

were "lack of harmony with the committee which was detrimen¬
tal to the welfare of the schools, and the belief that we
can obtain and maintain a higher standard .

.

.with the

assistance of some superintendent other than yourself,"

The

petitioner was dismissed at a meeting of the school board on
June 25, 1925.
The case was first referred to an auditor, then heard
by a single justice who denied the petition.

The case then

went to the full body of the Supreme Court which upheld the
decision of its single justice who said in parts
The vote to dismiss the petitioner was valid.
Upon the evidence of the report of the auditor,
I am unable to conclude that the action of the
members of the committee was dictated solely by
personal ill will.
The vote of the town had no
binding or legal effect to control the action
of members of the committee; but they could con¬
sider in deciding what was for the welfare of
the schools the feeling of large numbers of
citizens towards the superintendent.'59
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Lack of Harmony and Cooperation if Detrimental to Welfare
of Schools are Sufficient Grounds for Dismissal — In
Toothaker vs. Rockland the single justice of the Supreme
Court stated further as follows:
Dealing with the matter as one of dis¬
cretion, I do not feel that one whose useful¬
ness as a superintendent is so doubtful in
view of the circumstances disclosed by the
evidence, should be retained in office by
this court; even though his ability and
willingness to render good service to the
schools of Rockland are as great as, from the
evidence, I believe them to be, and although
his dismissal is so likely to be a cause of
regret to the committee and the town.^O
Adjournment of Meeting Concerning Dismissal until a Late
Date in Compliance with Section Forty-two — In the same
case, Toothaker vs. Rockland, it was decided that a meeting
of a school committee of three at which one of the committee
did not attend but of which he had sufficient notice was in
compliance with section 42, and the members present could
lawfully adjourn until a later day when final action upon
the dismissal of the superintendent was taken by a twothirds vote.

41

Counsel May Appear for the Committee — The Supreme Court
ruled also in Toothsker vs. Rockland that it was not contrary
to section 42 for counsel to appear for the committee at a
hearing on dismissal.

40
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the regularity and validity of the action taken.42
"Superintendent to Recommend Dismissal” Applies to All
Public Schools -- Duffey vs. School Committee of Hopkinton
is a case in which Ellen L. Duffey petitioned the Supreme
Court for a writ of mandamus to secure reinstatement as a
teacher in the public schools of Hopkinton, a position from
which the petitioner alleged she was wrongfully removed.
Miss Duffey was employed on tenure when she was noti¬
fied of the intended action of the committee and the reason
given was "conduct unbecoming a teacher and insubordination."
The superintendent did not recommend the dismissal.

She was

dismissed at a meeting of the committee held December 6, 1919.
The chief question presented was whether the Statute
1914, chapter 714, which required the superintendents re¬
commendation for dismissal, was applicable to a town like
Hopkinton which was joined with other towns to form a superin¬
tendency union.
The Supreme Court in sustaining the petition and order¬
ing the petitioner reinstated to her position formerly held
said as follows:
The advice of the superintendent, who may be
presumed to possess more than the ordinary skill
and judgment touching the general competency and
usefulness of teachers, may be quite as necessary
in order to prevent injustice and to insure the
highest possible efficiency of the public schools
in the small town as in the larger centers.

42
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No recommendation by the superintendent of
schools was made as to the proposed dismissal
of the petitioner; hence the school committee
acted beyond their power in attempting to
discharge the petitioner from service.
Recommendation of Superintendent Need not Favor Dismissal —
Sheldon vs. School Committee of Hopedale is a case in which
Elba Sherburne Sheldon petitioned the Supreme Court for a
writ of mandamus to compel the school committee of Hopedale
to reinstate her as a teacher in the public schools of the
town.
The petitioner was dismissed by the school committee
on October 14, 1930, pursuant to a rule passed at a meeting
on May 20, 1930, to instruct the superintendent of schools
to "eliminate from our teaching force female married teachers,”
This vote of May was taken without prior specific recommen¬
dation in regard thereto by the superintendent.
The case was heard before a single justice who ordered
the petition dismissed as the "committee throughout acted
in good faith and in the belief that their rule was of bene¬
fit to the schools."

The petitioner excepted and the case
X

went before the full court.

This body stated in part that it

was not necessary to the validity of such dismissal that the
recommendation to the committee by the superintendent under
section 42 favor dismissal; that statute requires that the
committee have the superintendents advice, but it is not in-
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tended that their action be controlled thereby.44
Thanksgiving Recess not a Vacation Period — The case of
Duffey vs. Hopkinton brought forth the opinion from the
Supreme Court that the Thanksgiving recess is not a vaca¬
tion within the meaning of section 42, requiring notice of
dismissal T,at least thirty days prior to the meeting ex¬
clusive of customary vacation periods.
Conduct Unbecoming a Teacher and Insubordination are Suffi¬
cient Grounds for Dismissal — The Supreme Court decided
also in Duffey vs. Hopkinton that where the reasons for which
dismissal is proposed are "conduct unbecoming a teacher and
insubordination”, that is a sufficient compliance with the
terms of section 42, at least in the absence of demand for
more specific specifications.

46

"Good Cause” is any Ground that is in Good Faith — Rinaldo
vs. School Committee of Revere is a case in which Clara
Rinaldo petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus
to secure her reinstatement as a teacher in the public
schools of Revere.
The petitioner was serving on tenure in said City when
the school committee passed a ruling that marriage of a woman
teacher would operate as an automatic resignation of said
teacher and that the regulation would apply to teachers on

44 Sheldon vs. School Committee of Hopedale, 276 Mass. 230.
45
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tenure.

The petitioner was well aware of this rule, as her

contracts contained express stipulations that marriage would
terminate her contract, to which she assented.
1935, she married.

In June,

The following September the school com¬

mittee would not permit her to teach, and on November 12,
1935, after a notice and a hearing, she was dismissed, the
causes stated being her violation of the terms of the contract.
There was no evidence of bad faith on the part of the com¬
mittee.
The case was heard by a single justice who found
material facts and reported the case for hearing to the full
court.

This body, in deciding on whether such a policy

adapted by the school committee could be found to be "good
cause" under section 42 stated as follows:
1 Good cause* includes any ground which is put
forward by the committee in good faith and which
is not arbitrary, irrational, unreasonable, or
irrelevant to the committee*s task of building
up and maintaining an efficient school system.
If the cause for dismissal is at least fairly
debatable and is asserted honestly, and not as a
subterfuge, that is enough.
It is by no means
limited to some form of inefficiency or mis¬
conduct on the part of the person dismissed.
The
statutory power was in fact followed.
On the basis of this finding, the Supreme Court dismissed the
petition.

47

Hearing not Illegal if Case not Reached for Hearing until
Late in Evening -- In the case of Houghton vs. School Com-

Rinaldo vs. School Committee of Revere, 296 Mass. 167.
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mittee of Somerville it was brought out that a hearing,
under section 42, of a case which need take but a short
time was not illegal in that the case was not reached for
a hearing until 10:15 o’clock in the evening,48
Reports of Conduct Resulting in Dismissal not Sufficient
Evidence to Warrant an Action for Unlawful Interference —
The case of Caverno vs. Fellows, discussed at the begin¬
ning of this chapter, indicates that an action for unlawful
interference, on the part of the plaintiff’s immediate
superior teacher in the high school, of the principal, and
of the superintendent, with the plaintiff’s right to continue
as a teacher under tenure could not be maintained on evidence
merely that the defendants made reports of conduct of the
plaintiff which resulted In her dismissal by the school com¬
mittee, there being no evidence that the conduct of any of
the defendants was actuated by ill will toward, or a purpose
to harm, the plaintiff, rather than by a justifiable purpose
to perform their respective duties.

49

A Delay In Bringing Petition for a Court Writ doe3 not Con¬
stitute Negligence to Bar It -- This case, Peckham vs. Mayor
of Fall River, while not provoked by any of the sections
under discussion, is cited because of a decision that might
very readily be of use in any case based upon a petition for

48 Houghton vs. School Committee of Somerville, 506 Mass.
542.
49
Caverno vs. Fellows, 300 Mass. 331.
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a writ of mandamus.
Lester M. Peekham filed a petition in the Supreme
Court on April 22, 1925, for a writ of mandamus directing
the mayor and commissioners of the reservoir commission of
Fall River to reinstate the petitioner "in his employment
as an ox driver in the reservoir department .

.

.

The petitioner was appointed to his position under
civil service and was so employed until July 12, 1924, when
he was suspended without notice and without a hearing al¬
though there was work to be done of which he was capable of
doing and willing to do.
A single justice ordered the petition dismissed.

Ex¬

ceptions by the petitioner to this order brought the case
to the full court.

The full court, in reversing the order

of the single justice and sustaining the petition, said that
the petitioner could be dismissed only in the manner pointed
out in sections 43 and 45 of chapter 31 of the General Laws
which entitle a civil service employee to a hearing and that
if the petition had been brought immediately after his sus¬
pension, he would have been entitled to relief.

Consequently

his delay from the date of his suspension to the date of
petition does not bar relief nor constitute neglect.

50

Committee Member who is Biased or Prejudiced not Required to
Withdraw from Board under Certain Conditions -- In Moran vs.
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School Committee of Littleton, the petitioner, John Geddes
Moran, having been removed from his position as principal
of the high school of Littleton after a public hearing upon
charges preferred by the school committee, appealed from an
order of the Superior Court dismissing a petition for a writ
of mandamus which he brought to secure his reinstatement.
During his hearing before the committee, two of the
three members who then constituted the committee testified
under oath as witnesses, and were examined by counsel for the
petitioner.

Each of them after testifying resumed his duties

as a member of the committee.
In affirming the order of the Superior Court dismissing
the petition, the Supreme Court pointed out that it is a
general rule based on necessity and designed to enable an
administrative board to exercise its power where it might
otherwise be barred from so doing on account of the bias, in¬
terest, or prejudice of one or more of its members, that a
member who is biased or prejudiced against one on trial before
the board is not required to withdraw from the hearing if no
other board can hear and determine the matter being heard,
especially if his withdrawal would deprive the board of the
number of members required to take a valid affirmative vote.
Committee Member who Testifies as Witness not Disqualified
from Participating in Decisions of Committee — The Supreme

H
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Court stated further in Moran vs. Littleton:
The mere fact, that at a hearing by a school
committee of charges preferred by it under
chapter 71, section 42 as appearing in Statute
1934, chapter 123 against a teacher serving at
its discretion, two of its three members testi¬
fied under oath as witnesses and were examined
by the committee^ counsel and cross examined
by counsel for the teacher, did not disqualify
the two from resuming their function as members
of the committee and participating in its de¬
cision.52
Error in Proceedings Prejudicial to Dismissed Teacher is
Basis for Court Action — The opinion was handed down in
Moran vs. Littleton that a school teacher dismissed by the
committee following proceedings under General Law chapter
71, section 42, as appearing in Statute 1934, chapter 123,
is not entitled to a writ of mandamus to secure his rein¬
statement unless he proves that the school committee com¬
mitted an error in such proceedings and that the error was
prejudicial to hlm.^
Admission of Affidavits as Evidence not Prejudicial if
Charges Substantiated Otherwise -- The Supreme Court further
stated in Moran vs. Littleton:
We think one has no just ground of complaint
because an administrative board in conducting
a hearing of charges against him has permitted
the introduction of hearsay evidence ^affi¬
davit a _7 when he has failed to show that the
other evidence was not adequate to support the
conclusion reached by the board.
The burden
was on him to prove that the decision resulted
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in a substantial injustice to him.
not appear on this record.54

That does

Answers to Questions on Section Forty-two
1. Must the school committee elaborate on specifica¬
tions for dismissal? — A statement of reasons for
dismissal is sufficient compliance with section
42, and a committee need not elaborate on such speci¬
fications.
2. Is the statutory power of a school committee strict¬
ly or freely construed? — The statutory power of
a school committee has always been freely construed.
3. What is the meaning of the term "judicial investi¬
gation” as it applies here? — A hearing under
section 42 is in the nature of a judicial investi¬
gation after preferment of charges and notice, and
the establishment of sufficient cause for dismissal
by adequate evidence.
4. What is the meaning of the word "substantiated” as
it applies here? — The word "substantiated” has
been defined to mean ”to establish the existence or
truth of, by true or competent evidence.”
5. What teachers are covered by this section? -Teachers in all public schools are included in this
section.

54

Ibid.

64

6. Does a vote of dismissal indicate that the
charges have been substantiated? — A two-thirds
vote of the whole committee to dismiss a teacher
is, in substance, a vote that the charges have
been substantiated by evidence Introduced at the
hearing.
7. Must the school committee always act in the inter¬
est of the schools? -- The school committee must
always act in a manner which will be to the best
interests of the schools.
8. Is the committee empowered to change duties of a
teacher on tenure? — The general managerial powers
of the school committee include the power to change
by a majority vote the duties of teachers on tenure
at discretion and to assign them to new duties.
9. May counsel appear for the committee? — It is not
contrary to section 42 for counsel to appear for
the committee at a hearing on dismissal.
10. Must recommendation of superintendent favor dis¬
missal? — The statute requires that the committee
have the superintendents advice, but it is not
intended that their action be controlled thereby.
11. What constitutes "good cause"? — "Good cause"
includes any ground which is put forward by the
committee in good faith and which is not arbitrary,
irrational, unreasonable, or irrelevant to the
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committee! s task of building up and maintain¬
ing an efficient system,
12. Must a board member who is prejudiced withdraw
from board during vote on dismissal? — A member
who is prejudiced against one on trial before a
board is not required to withdraw from the hear¬
ing if no other board can hear and determine the
matter being heard, especially if his withdrawal
would deprive the board of the number of members
required to take a valid affirmative vote.
13. Does the section afford any protection to a
teacher on tenure over one not on tenure, if a
dismissal is required because of a decrease in
enrolment? — At present a teacher on tenure has
no protection over one not on tenure if a dis¬
missal is required because of a decrease of en¬
rolment.

However, House Bill 365 which is due

shortly for hearing before the Legislature is de¬
signed to protect the teacher on tenure if a dis¬
missal is required because of a decrease of
enrolment.

CHAPTER V
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON SECTION FORTY-THREE
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SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON SECTION FORTY-THREE

Section 43 of chapter 71 of the General Laws (Tercen¬
tenary Edition) of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts is
stated here.
Salary Law —
The salary of no teacher employed in any
town except Boston to serve at discretion
shall be reduced without his consent except
by a general salary revision affecting equally
all teachers of the same salary grade In the
town.
The salary of no superintendent so
employed shall be reduced without his consent
until at least one year after the committee
has so voted,
A few questions have arisen in connection with this
section.

The questions are:

1. What effect does a reduction from principal to
teacher have on salary?
2. Does section 43 cover a reduction of salary made
in bad faith?
3. What is the interpretation of the term "same
salary grade?”
4. Does the section protect a salary the right to
which was never vested?
5. What is the effect of dismissal made In good faith
before end of school year on remainder of salary?
The Supreme Court decisions on cases provoked by section
43 are presented herewith, following which the questions
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listed above are answered*
of Reduction of Rank on Salary — — In Downey vs • School
Committee of Lowell where Miss Downey attempted to obtain
court action to effect her reinstatement to the rank and
salary of principal following a vote of the school committee
to close the school of which she was principal and to re¬
duce her to a teacher in another elementary school, originally
at the same salary, but later at a lower salary, the Supreme
Court said:
The fact that the petitioner was chosen as
a grammar school principal, and was paid the
same salary as other such principals, does not
show that she was in the 1 same salary grade'
as the others after her school was closed and
theirs was left open.
She was not entitled to
be classed with them as to salary after that
marked change in situation occurred. After
that change she was the only person in her
'salary grade' and section 43 afforded her no
protection.55
A similar decision was arrived at in Sweeney vs. Revere.^
Reduction of Salary Made in Bad Faith — The Supreme Court
held in Downey vs. Lowell that there was nothing to show any
want of good faith in the reduction of salary in this case.
It said:
We assume without deciding that the employ¬
ment of the petitioner by the school committee
'to serve at its discretion' prevented a re¬
duction of salary made in bad faith for the
purposes of punishment or favoritism, even
though the specific provision of section 43 did

Downey vs. School Committee of Lowell, 305 Mass. 329.
56
Sweeney vs. School Committee of Revere, 249 Mass. 525.
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not apply.57
Interpretation of Term "Same Salary Grade" — The Supreme
Court clarified the term Msame salary grade” in Paquette vs.
Pall River.

Here the court said:

The word ’grade* in this section is designed
plainly to include 811 public school teachers
employed in a particular municipality, regard¬
less of the name of the school in which the
service may be rendered.
The word ’grade’ is
broad enough also to comprise tenure of office.
Clearly identity of salary is not the sole
test in determining ’same salary grade*.
It
is only one factor in determining whether speci¬
fied teachers are ’of the same salary grade*.
In deciding whether a general salary revision
affects all teachers ’of same salary grade’,
consideration must be given not only to salary
received, but also to the sum of the factors
comprehended within the scope of ’grade*.
Two teachers, one having a contract for one
year only and the other having a continuous
and indeterminate service, cannot rightly be
said to be in the same salary grade even though
receiving identical sums as salary.^8
Section Forty-three not Intended to Protect a "Salary” the
Right to Which never became Vested — In McDevitt vs. Malden
where the petitioner sought reinstatement to a position as
principal and to be paid the salary which was voted with
said position while he had never assumed such duties because
of a vote of the next committee which declared said position
*

»

vacant, and demoted him to his former rank, the Supreme
Court stated that the petitioner was not entitled to the in¬
crease in salary as it was not the intent of section 43 to

Downey vs. School Committee of Lowell, 305 Mass. 329.
Paquette vs. School Committee of Fall River, 278 Mass.
172.
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protect a "salary" the right to which never became vested.59
Effect of Dismissal Made in Good Faith before End of School
Year on Salary — In the case of Wood vs. Inhabitants of
Medfield, Cornelius E. Wood attempted to recover $150 alleged
due him as unpaid salary as a teacher in the high school of
Medfield in Superior Court without Jury.
His contract for the year 1873-1874, with the under¬
standing that he teach for the year, was $1200.

The school

committee voted to close the school on May 29, 1874, and
discharge the teacher.

They notified the plaintiff that his

services were no longer required but gave no reason for their
action.
The Superior Court Judge ordered Judgment for the de¬
fendant.

The plaintiff alleged exceptions and the case went

to the Supreme Court.

In overruling the exceptions the

Supreme Court said that there was no authority in law by
which a school committee can bind the town to pay for the
services of a teacher after he shall have been discharged by
60
the school committee acting under its obligations of duty.
Answers to Questions Concerning Section Forty-three
1. What effect does a reduction from a principal to
a teacher have on salary? — If a teacher is,.
after said reduction, the only person of "the same

McDevitt vs. School Committee of Malden, 298 Mass. 213.
Wood vs. Inhabitants of Medfield, 123 Mass. 545.
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salary grade", and has been demoted in good
faith, he has no recourse through law to demand
the salary that went with the higher rank.
2. Does section 43 cover a reduction of salary made
in bad faith? — A teacher who has been voted a
reduction in salary may recover if the reduction
was made in bad faith.
3. What is the interpretation of the term "same
salary grade?" — "Same salary grade" involves a
consideration not only of salary received, but
also the sum factors comprehended within the
scope of "grade" such as tenure.
4. Does the section protect a salary the right to
which was never vested? — Section 43 does not
protect such a salary.
5. What is the effect of dismissal made in good faith
before end of school year on remainder of salary? There is no authority under law to compel a town
to pay for services after a teacher has been dis¬
charged in good faith.
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Section 63 of chapter 71 of the General Laws (Ter¬
centenary Edition) of the Coimnonwealth of Massachusetts
is stated in part below.
Tenure of Office and Dismissal of Superintendents of School
Unions —

year term, a superintendent of schools, deter¬
mine the relative amount of service to be
rendered by him in each town, fix his salary,
which shall not be reduced during his term. . . .
He may be removed, with the consent of the de¬
partment, by a two thirds vote of the full
membership of the joint committee.
A superin¬
tendent In a union who has served continuously
in the same union for more than three years
and who has been employed at least twice as
superintendent In said union, each for a term
of three years, shall not be removed except for
inefficiency. Insubordination or other good
cause, nor without full compliance with the pro¬
visions of section forty-two, relative to
teachers and other superintendents, as to notice
of intention to dismiss, specification of
charges, hearing and substantiation of charges.
Section 2.
Notwithstanding the provisions
of section one of this act, a superintendent of
a superintendency union In office on its effective
date shall not be entitled to the benefits there¬
of except after he has been re-employed in said
office.
The questions which have arisen in connection with section
63 are:
!• Do teachers come under this section?
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2. Are acts of joint committee binding on each of
the towns comprising the union?
3. Who can discharge a union superintendent?
4. Can a union superintendent be appointed for less
than a three year term?
5. Can a union superintendent be dismissed while on
tenure?
6. Has a joint committee the right to rescind a vote
for a superintendent?
The Supreme Court decisions and the opinion of the
attorney general on cases brought about by this section are
presented below.

They are followed by the answers to the

above questions.
Teachers in a Superintendency Union not under Section Sixtythree — The Supreme Court decided in the case of Duffey vs.
School Committee of Hopkinton that section 42 included all
teachers within the Commonwealth.

Consequently there are no

provisions for teachers in section 63.
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Joint Committee Agent for Each Town — Freeman vs. Inhabitants
of Bourne, was a case involving an action of contract on the
part of the superintendent of the school district of Sandwich,
Bourne, and Mashpee against the town of Bourne to recover
salary which the plaintiff alleged was owed to him.
Howard S. Freeman was elected superintendent of said

61 Duffey vs. School Committee of Hopkinton, 236 Mass. 5.
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district at a meeting of the joint committees on October 9,
1893, following a meeting at which the former superinten¬
dent, who was under indictment for adultery, had been dis¬
missed.

The school committee of the defendant town protested

against such action and continued the former superintendent
in office in that town.

The plaintiff assumed his duties in

the district on November 7, 1893 and was reelected again in
April, 1894, to take effect June 15, 1894.

Between these

two dates the plaintiff received no salary from the defendant
town.
The case was submitted tm the Superior Court, and after
Judgment for the plaintiff, to the Supreme Court, on appeal.
The Supreme Court in affirming judgment for the plaintiff
said in part:

’’For the purposes of the statute (Statute

1888, chapter 431), the joint committee became the agents of
each town, and their acts within the scope of their authority
are binding upon each town.”^
Superintendent under Control of Joint Committee — In Freeman
vs. Bourne the Supreme Court said:

’’When several towns unite

for the purpose of the employment of a superintendent of
schools under the authority of section 63, such superinten¬
dent can be employed only by the Joint committee, and can
be discharged only by the joint committee, if the power of

62

Freeman vs. Inhabitants of Bourne, 170 Mass. 289.
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dismissal exists."^
Union Superintendent must be Appointed for Three Years —
In a letter to the State Commissioner of Education dated
December 3, 1919, the Attorney General stated In request to
an opinion concerning the legality of electing a union
superintendent temporarily for a period of six months:

"It

is my opinion that a superintendent must be employed for a
three year term, regardless of when employment begins."64
Union Superintendent may, under Certain Conditions, be
Dismissed while under Tenure — In Freeman vs. Bourne the
court decided that In the selection and employment of a
superintendent of schools there Is an implied condition which
authorizes his dismissal, if circumstances arise which render
him no longer able or fit to perform the duties of his posi¬
tion.
Committee may Declare Office of Union Superintendent Vacant —
Again referring to Freeman vs. Bourne, the Supreme Court
ruled in this case that the pendency of an indictment for
adultery against a superintendent of schools, chosen by a
joint committee formed by the school committees of towns
■uniting for the purpose of the employment of a superintendent
under this section, warrant the committee to declare his

63

Ibid.

64
Opinion of Attorney General, Vol. 5, p. 422.
65

.

Freeman vs. Inhabitants of Bourne, 170 Mass. 289
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office vacant.66
Right of a Committee to Rescind. Vote for a Superintendent ——
In Reed vs. School Committee of Deerfield and another,
William A. Reed petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of
mandamus to compel the school committee of Deerfield and the
petitioner’s predecessor in office to recognize the vote of
the joint committee of Hatfield, Leverett, and Deerfield
which elected him as superintendent of the school union com¬
prising those three towns.
At a meeting of the joint committee on April 7, 1900,
the petitioner’s predecessor, then in office, received a
fraction of a vote over another candidate for the position
of superintendent.

The chairman declared that there had

been no election, and the meeting was adjourned until April
21, 1900.

The respondent. Barton, continued to serve as

superintendent until this petition was filed.
At the meeting held on April 21, 1900, it was voted to
rescind the vote of the previous meeting.

The meeting then

proceeded to the election of a new superintendent.

The

petitioner received twelve votes and Barton received eleven
votes.

The chairman declared the petitioner elected, and no

objection was made thereto.
The petitioner was informed of his election as super-

66

Ibid.
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intendent of schools and began his duties on April 26, 1900.
On May 7, 1900, he received a notice from the Deerfield com¬
mittee that they would recognize Barton as superintendent.
The Supreme Court in sustaining the petition pointed
out that, at the first meeting, the respondent. Barton, was
elected and should have been elected by the chair.

However,

this was not done and the committee rescinded the vote which
elected Barton.

On this point the court stated:

"We are

of the opinion that it was. within the power of the meeting
n 07
to rescind its vote."
Answers to Questions Concerning Section Sixty-three —
1. Do teachers come under this section? — Teachers
do not come under this section, but under sections
41, and 42.
2. Are acts of joint committee binding on each of the
towns comprising the union? — The joint committee
are the agents for each town, and their acts with¬
in the scope of their authority are binding upon
each town.
3. Who can discharge a union superintendent? — Where
several towns unite for the purpose of employment
of a superintendent of schools, such superintendent
can be discharged only by the joint committee, if
the power of dismissal exists.

67

Reed vs. School Committee of Deerfield & another, 172
Mass. 473.
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4. Can a union Superintendent be appointed for less
than a three year term? — A union superintendent
must be employed for a three year term, regard¬
less of when employment begins.
5. Can a union superintendent be dismissed while on
tenure? — A union superintendent can be dismissed
while on tenure, if circumstances arise which render
him no longer able or fit to perform the duties of
his position.
6. Has a joint committee the right to rescind a vote
for a superintendent? — It is within the power
of a joint committee to rescind its vote in this
respect.

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

Y

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

This study has offered first, in chapter two, a
history of the laws regarding tenure which shows the devel¬
opment of these laws to the present day.

It has offered

also, in following chapters, an analysis of Supreme Court
decisions and opinions of attorney generals dealing with the
tenure laws.

On the basis of the information contained in

the previous chapters an attempt is made here to arrive at
a conclusion which will answer the main question which pro¬
voked this study, namely:

"What protection do the laws of

Massachusetts give to me as a teacher in the public schools
of the state in regard to the permanency of my position?"
The introduction broke this question down into a series of
more specific questions.

The procedure here will be to answer

these specific questions and use these answers as the basis
for an answer to the general question.
Meaning of the Word "Tenure" and its Purpose — Tenure Is de¬
fined as "the term of holding office."^®

It is a status to

which teachers, supervisors, principals and superintendents
attain upon fulfillment of the conditions of the tenure
statute.

The purpose of the tenure statute has been declared

68 Devlin, Joseph, Webster's New Standard Dictionary;, the
World Syndicate Publishing Company, p. 956.
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to be the promotion of "good order and the welfare of the
state and of the school system by preventing the removal
of capable and experienced teachers at the political or
personal whim of changing office holders."
Laws Pertaining to Tenure — As has been pointed out pre¬
viously, the laws regarding the tenure of teachers in Massa¬
chusetts are contained in sections 41, 42, 43, and 63 of
chapter 71 of the General Laws (Tercentenary Edition) of
go
Massachusetts.
Section 41 concerns itself with the condi¬
tions which must be met by a teacher in order to attain the
tenure status and with the necessity of the school board*s
compliance.

Section 42 treats of the procedure which must be

followed by a school committee to dismiss a teacher and the
rights to which a teacher has access if he is about to be
dismissed.

Section 43 deals with the salary rights of teachers

and is included in this study because of the importance a
reduction in salary plays in relation to the attractiveness
of a position.

Section 63 contains the 18W relative to the

employment, tenure, dismissal, and salary of superintendents
of superintendency unions.
Those Protected by Tenure Laws -- The Supreme Court has ruled
that all teachers, supervisors, and principals employed in
the public schools of the state, except in Boston, and all
superintendents, except those in Boston and those employed by
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See Chapter II.
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superintendency unions, are protected by the laws contain¬
ed in sections 41, 42, and 43 of chapter 71.

Union superin¬

tendents are protected by section 63 of the same chapter.
Conditions for Dismissal -- The conditions under which a
teacher on tenure may be dismissed have been brought out quite
clearly in several cases before the Supreme Court.
Rinaldo vs. Revere,

In

the decision wss based on ’’good cause”,

a term existing in section 42.

Here the court stated:

•Good cause* includes any ground which is
put forward by the committee in good faith and
which is not arbitrary, irrational, unreason¬
able, or irrevelant to the committee*s task
of building up and maintaining an efficient
school system.
If the cause for dismissal is
at least fairly debatable and is asserted
honestly, and not as a subterfuge, that is
enough.
It is by no means limited to some
form of inefficiency or misconduct on the
part of the person dismissed.
It follows from the above definition that marriage of a woman
teacher can be classed as ’’good cause” within the meaning
of section 42 If a school committee honestly rules it so.
It Is to be understood that the conditions for dis¬
missal as stated in section 42 must be complied with entirely.
The previous chapters contain many decisions in which the
court compelled the school committee to reinstate a teacher
for failure to comply with such Items as a two thirds vote
of the whole committee, thirty days notice, a hearing and
specifications In writing if requested, substantiation of
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charges, and recommendation of the superintendent in the
case of a teacher, supervisor, or principal.

The same re¬

quirements are contained in section 63.
Dismissal of Teacher Serving on Tenure because of Decreased
Enrolment — As the law stands at present, a teacher serving
on tenure may be dismissed if there is a sufficient decrease
in enrolment to render a decrease in the teaching force
necessary.

Under such a condition the committee is not re¬

quired to give a teacher a hearing or a notice, nor must
\

charges be specified or substantiated in a judicial investi¬
gation.

The law makes no provision to protect tenure

teachers over non-tenure teachers in this respect although
legislation is now pending to remedy this condition.
Power of School Committee -- "The power of the school committee”, as stated in Pulvino vs. Yarmouth,

71

"is conferred

in the most general terms, and it is to be exercised when¬
ever in the judgment of those to whom it is committed the
public good for any cause requires it.

^f this they shall

be the exclusive judges.”
The school committee must, in reappointing a teacher
who has served for three consecutive previous years, appoint
such teacher to serve at its discretion.

In Paquette vs.

Fall River, discretion was defined as "a decision of what is

71

Ibid.
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just end proper in the circumstances."72

in connection with

the powers of the school committee, it must be remembered
that its powers are limited to the law and it cannot lengthen
the three year tenure statute.
Reinstatement of a Dismissed Teacher — The previous chapters
record many cases where the Supreme Court has ordered rein¬
statement of teachers because the school committees failed
to act in good faith or did not comply with each and every
requirement of section 42 in effecting the dismissals.
Tenure Laws may be Rendered Ineffective — A previous para¬
graph indicated the broad powers possessed by the school
committee.

This power is conferred on the school committee

by the legislature.

An opinion of an attorney general

pointed out that as the legislature is empowered to enact laws,
7

* **

it is also able to render such laws Ineffective.

Teacher should Assert Rights — A tenure teacher who has been
notified by the school committee of their intention to vote
on his dismissal should lose no time In asserting his rights
under the law if he believes the committee is acting un'

justly.

Such rights consist of receiving a hearing and a

written statement of charges, if requested.
If a teacher has been dismissed and believes that the
committee has acted unfairly, he should file in court a
petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the committee to
_

Ibid.
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Ibid
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restore him to his position.
Reduction of Salary to Force Resignation — If a teacher is
the only one in "the same salary grade", his salary may be
reduced in compliance with section 43.

If, however, such

reduction can be proved to have been made in bad faith, to
✓

force a teacher*s resignation, that teacher may recover the
loss of salary.
It is apparent from the opinions of the Supreme Court
that the law gives a considerable amount of protection to
the positions of teachers serving on tenure.

It is manda¬

tory that a school committee act in good faith, asserted
honestly and not as a subterfuge. In effecting a dismissal
of a tenure teacher.

Furthermore, section 42 gives the

teacher certain rights in connection with dismissal which are
stated above In this chapter.
It is remotely possible that a school board could act
in bad faith on a dismissal and cover their action under
the cloak of acting in the best interests of the schools.
With the exception of this possibility and that of a tenure
teacher being dismissed because of decreased enrolment,
the facts indicate that a tenure teacher receives a high de¬
gree of protection from unjust Interference with his posi¬
tion in the public schools of Massachusetts.

Statute 1934,

chapter 123, increased greatly the degree of protection
afforded a teacher on tenure.
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Under such a high degree of protection as offered by
the laws, it would prove unwise and useless on the part
of a school committee to dismiss a teacher serving under
tenure unless by so doing the committee was carrying out
their primary duty of acting for the best interest of
the schools.

r-
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APPENDIX I
COURT CASES AND OPINIONS IMPORTANT
TO THIS STUDY

This chapter consists of a presentation in alphabeti¬
cal order of the Supreme Court cases which were the main
source of material for this study, followed by the two
opinions of the attorney generals which were cited in pre¬
vious chapters, in lieu of an annotated bibliography.
In the event that a reader is not familiar with the
system of references used in connection with legal reports,
an explanation is given here.
All of the cases referred
to in this study are cases that were decided on by the
Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
These cases are recorded in the "Massachusetts Reports” which
is the official title of the publication that reports on the
cases decided on by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
Consider as an example Graves vs. School Committee of Welles¬
ley, 299 Mass. 80 (1937).
The number 299 represents the
number of the volume of the Massachusetts Reports” in which
the case is recorded.
The ”Mass." indicates that the case
is recorded in said reports, and the number 80 represents
the page on which the record of the case begins.
The
number 1937 is not usually found in an arrangement of this
type, as the volume number gives some idea as to the approxi¬
mate year in which the case went before the court.
How¬
ever, as the average reader will not be able to determine
the year under the usual arrangement, the liberty has been
taken here to include it for the reader’s convenience.
Boody vs. School Committee of Barnstable, 276 Mass. 134,
T1931) — Louis M. Boody was employed on tenure by theSchool
Committee of Barnstable, having served as a teacher and prin¬
cipal for many years.
In 1929 the petitioner was elected by
the committee, then consisting of three members, to be super¬
vising principal of the high and junior high schools at an
annual salary of ^3,600.
He performed these duties during
the school year of 1929-1930.
In the spring of 1930, the
membership of the school committee was increased from three
to five, and on September 18, 1930, the enlarged committee
voted, three to two, to change Mr. Boody’s duties to those
of a teacher in the high school.
No change in salary was
made.
No notice was given Mr. Boody of the committee's intent to change his duties from principal to teacher prior
to its meeting of September 18, 1930.

90

Boody petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of man¬
damus to compel the school committee to reinstate him as
a supervising principal.
The case was heard before an
auditor and single member of the Supreme Court who ordered
the petition dismissed.
The petitioner alleged exceptions
and the case went before the full court.
The essential matter for decision before this body was
whether under General Law chapter 71, section 42, as
amended by Statute 1921, chapter 293, a majority vote or a
two—thirds vote of the school committee was required where
the duties of a teacher on tenure at discretion are changed
from those of a principal to those merely of giving in¬
struction as a teacher.
The court, in overruling the exceptions and finding
for the respondent (school committee), stated that no limit¬
ation Is placed by this statute on the power of a majority
of the school committee to change or lessen the duty
assigned to a teacher.
"We do not interpret the law as
creating a class of principals as distinct from teachers.11
Callahan vs. Woburn, 506 Mass. 265 (1940) — In an action
of contract involving forty-one employees of the City of
Woburn, the plaintiffs, some of whom were school teachers
including Frank P. Callahan, sued the city for the balance
of their lawfully fixed salaries, unpaid because of in¬
sufficient appropriations.
The Superior Court of Middlesex
found in favor of the plaintiffs.
The defendant, the City
of Woburn, alleged exceptions and the Supreme Court sustain¬
ed the exceptions in favor of the city.
The Supreme Court
stated in Its decision that section 34 of chapter 71 of the
General Laws, dealing with expenditures in anticipation of
appropriations, provides the only remedy for recovery.
The
court also brought out that teachers who are not employed at
discretion, although not covered by the provisions of
sections 41, 42, and 43 of chapter 71 of the General Laws,
are nevertheless under contract.
Caverno vs. Fellows, 500 Mass. 531 (1938) -- This case was
before the Supreme Court previously in 286 Mass. 440.
The
facts in the case, an action of tort, were the same In both
cases with the exception that in the first case the plain¬
tiff alleged that the defendants. Fellows, Superintendent of
Schools in Gloucester, Johnson, principal of the high school
of said city, and Harris, supervisor of English in the high
school "unlawfully and without justifiable cause did con¬
spire to have said plaintiff dismissed from her position as
teacher in the high school and in pursuance of said conspiracy made false, fictitious and fraudulent charges o
e
members of the school committee of the said city of Glouces¬
ter and did hamper, obstruct and impede the said plaintifi
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in her work as a teacher . . . and did watch and annoy her
and did make false and fictitious charges, accusations and
statements about and against her,”
The plaintiff taught under tenure in the high school.
She was faculty advisor for a school news column which was
published occasionally in the local paper.
Evidence showed
that the plaintiff had had difficulties with all three de¬
fendants which led up to her discharge.
The defendants demurred to the declarations on the
grounds that no particular false, fictitious, or fraudulent
charge or act is specified.
The Supreme Court sustained the
demurra* to the declarations because there was no tort set
out as to a single defendant.
The plaintiff then alleged malicious interference on
the part of the defendants in an amended declaration and the
case went before a single justice of the Supreme Court in
Caverno vs. Fellows, 300 Mass. 331 who returned a directed
verdict for the defendants.
The plaintiff excepted and the
case went before the full court.
The court overruled the
exceptions stating that there was no evidence that the con¬
duct of any of the defendants was actuated by ill will toward,
or a purpose to harm, the plaintiff, rather than by a justi¬
fiable purpose to perform their respective duties.
Corrigan vs. School Committee of New Bedford, 250 Mass. 334
n^Tr—'ThTi" case was the result of a petition by Alice T.
Corrigan, the principal of a public school in New Bedford,
for a writ of mandamus to compel the school committee to
furnish her full and complete specifications of the reasons
assigned by them for their contemplated action in proceeding
to vote upon her dismissal as principal.
She had been principal of the school in question for
about twelve years before filing this petition.
On June 29,
1923, the school committee voted:
"At a meeting of the
school committee to be held on October 19, 1923, a vote shall
be taken on the question of the dismissal of Alice T. Corri¬
gan, principal of the Betsey B. Winslow School, and* that
notice be sent forthwith to her of this intention by the com¬
mittee."
The petitioner then requested of the committee a
statement "of its reasons for which her dismissal as principal
is proposed."
At a meeting of the committee held September 14,
1923, the committee assigned and stated the reasons to be:
"The committee1 s dissatisfaction with her work and the be¬
lief that she has not demonstrated constructive leadership
and necessary administrative capability."
On September 28,
1923, the petitioner asked for more definite specifications
to the committeefs reasons assigned for her dismissal.
The
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committee refused the request and set October 19, 1923,
as the date for a hearing.
The Supreme Court petition was filed October 18, 1923,
and upon a hearing, a single justice denied the petition
for a writ of mandamus.
The petitioner excepted and the
case went before the full court.
In overruling the except¬
ions the court 3aid in part:
"Teachers are employed in the
discretion of the school committee and discretion in itself
must imply freedom to act according to onefs own judgment.
The only limitation on that freedom material to this case
is that the committee shall upon request of the teacher
give a statement of the reasons for which the dismissal is
proposed.
These reasons were given and are a sufficient
ground for removal.”
Davis vs. School Committee of Somerville, 307 Mass. 354
(1940) ~
This case involved a petition for a writ of* mandarnus to restore the petitioner. Hazel M. Davis, to active
service as a teacher in the public schools of the City of
Somerville.
The case was heard by a single justice and then
by the full body of the Supreme Court.
The petitioner had been employed on tenure in Somer¬
ville and prior to that time in the town of Acton and con¬
sequently had "completed more than twenty years of creditable
service as a member of the Teachers* Retirement Association.”
The petitioner claimed failure on the part of the school
committee to notify the retirement board within five days
after her dismissal with a fair summary of the facts re¬
lating to her removal and that her removal consequently be¬
came null and void and that she should be restored to active
service without loss of compensation.
The court in dismissing the petition brought out that
the statute requiring notice to the retirement board refers
to civil service employees and not to teachers.
The court
said further:
”0ne of the most important duties involved
in the management of a school system is the choosing of
competent teachers.
The success of a school system depends
largely on the character and ability of the teachers,
un¬
less a school committee has authority to employ and discharge
teachers it would be difficult to perform properly its duty
of managing a school system.”
Downey vs. School Committee of Lowell, 505 Mass._529 (1940) iarollne A. Downey filed a petition In the Supreme
a writ of mandamus to require the school committee of Lovell
to restore her to the rank and salary
as
grammar school.
A single justice found the facts to be
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stated in the report of an auditor and ordered the peti¬
tion dismissed, but not on the grounds of discretion.
The
petitioner excepted to the order and the case went to the
full court.
The facts in the case were these:
The petitioner
served, under tenure, as principal of a grammar school in
Lowell at a salary of $3,600 until June, 1937, when the
school was closed by the committee in the interests of
economy.
At the reopening of schools in September, 1937,
the petitioner, though elected as a principal, was assigned
by the superintendent as a grade teacher in another school,
under the principal of that school.
She continued to re¬
ceive the pay of a principal until the beginning of 1938,
when by vote of the school committee her pay was reduced to
that of a grade teacher, $1,700 a year.
She was the only
grammar school principal without a school in which to act
as principal.
Various members of the school committee told
her informally that when a vacancy occurred in a grammar
school principalship she should have the place.
But when
in 1938 two such vacancies occurred, other persons were
chosen to fill them.
The Supreme Court in overruling the exceptions stated
in part:
HThe fact that the petitioner was chosen as a
grammar school principal, and was paid the same salary as
other such principals, does not show that she was in fthe
same salary grade1 as the others after her school was closed
and theirs was left open.
After that change, she was the
only person in her 1 salary grade* and section 43 afforded
her no protection.
HWe assume-wlthout deciding that the employment of the
petitioner by the school committee * to serve at its dis¬
cretion* prevented a reduction in salary made in bad faith
for purposes of punishment or favoritism, even though the
specific provisions of section 43 did not apply.
“When no law has been violated, and no statute has
made good faith essential to valid action, acts of adminis¬
trative officers cannot be attacked in judicial proceedings
on the ground that in fact these officers were not governed
by the highest standards of impartial snd unselfish per¬
formance of public duty.'1
Duffey vs. School Committee of Hopklnton, 256 Mass. 5 (1920)
Ellen L. Duffey petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of
mandamus to secure reinstatement as a teacher in the public
schools of Hopkinton, a position from which the petitioner
alleged that she had been wrongfully removed.
The petitioner had been a teacher in the high school
of Hopkinton from September, 1913, until December, 1919,

94

when she was dismissed by a two thirds vote of the committee.
She was notified in writing by letter dated November 1, 1919
' j the indention of the school committee to vote on the
question of her dismissal at a meeting to be held on
December 6, 1919.
The petitioner was informed that the reasons
for dismissal, were
conduct unbecoming a teacher and insub¬
ordination.
Ho recommendation was made by the superintendent
The chief question presented was whether the school
committee of a town like Hopkinton which was a member of a
superintendency union was bound by Statute 1914 which re¬
quired a superintendents recommendation in connection with
dismissal.
The Supreme Court said in ordering the petitioner re¬
instated:
The provision is broad in its language.
It
apparently includes all teachers within the commonwealth.
The advice of the superintendent, who may be presumed to
possess more than ordinary skill and judgment touching the
general competency and usefulness of teachers, may be quite
as necessary in order to prevent injustice and to insure the
highest possible efficiency of the public schools in the
small towns as in the larger centers.
"No recommendation by the superintendent of schools
was made as to the proposed dismissal of the petitioner;
hence the school committee acted beyond their power in attempt¬
ing to discharge the petitioner from service."
The court also pointed out that the Thanksgiving re¬
cess was not a customary vacation period within the meaning
of section 42.
Freeman vs. Inhabitants of Bourne, 170 Mass. 289 (1897) —
The joint committee of the superintendency union of Sandwich. Bourne, and Mashpee, at a special meeting on August 2,
1893, elected Delbert G. Donnocker to be superintendent to
fill a vacancy caused by the resignation of the former
superintendent.
In September, 1893, In the Superior Court,
County of Cumberland, and State of Maine, Donnocker was in¬
dicted for the crime of adultery.
He was tried by jury,
entered a plea of not guilty, and a verdict of guilty was
returned.
Exceptions filed by him were sustained by the
Supreme Court of Maine and a new trial was granted.
The
case was tried again In Superior Court and resulted in the
disagreement of the jury.
The case was tried a third time
and twenty-one days later was "nol pressed."
On October 2, 1893, at a special meeting of the joint
committee the office of superintendent was declared vs cant
by a vote of nine in the affirmative; none in the negative.
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TetAlt7lrC?Zlttel<0f

th® defendant town protested the

c^iVta^parH^s^e

^ “"J?***

for one week and on October*9, ^898 t£e^oint8^°U^d
chose the plaintiff to be supirlnwSS? "?^r the te™""
of ten^months at a salary of fifteen hundred dollars per
annum.
The school committee of the defendant town protested against such action.
On October 28, 1893, a special
ba?1tl?S^f thf, J°int COTnmlttee was held and on vote by
9 were
meetings of October 2 and October
9 were ratified, the defendant town non-concurring and
protesting.
e
T5ie d.ei’endant town retained Donnocker at their portion

tetl±TiGd

t0 recelve the services of the
plaintiff, although his services were legally tendered
On April 23, 1894, the annual meeting of the loint
committee was held and the plaintiff was regularly elected
superintendent of schools to take effect from June 15, 1894.
Assenting to this election, the defendant, after June 15,
duly paid its proportionate share of the salary to the
plaintiff and received his services.
The plaintiff received
no compensation from the defendant town from November 7,
1893 to June 15, 1894, and demanded payment for same, which
he was always ready and willing to perform.
The case, an action of contract, was submitted to the
Superior Court, and after judgment for the plaintiff, to
the Supreme Court, on appeal.
The plaintiff*s right to re¬
cover was denied by the defendant on the grounds that if the
power to dismiss a superintendent existed, it was not in the
joint committee, but in the municipality; that there was no
power to dismiss the superintendent; that the superintendent
could be dismissed only for cause, and that no sufficient or
legal cause of dismissal was disclosed.
The Supreme Court in affirming judgment for the plain¬
tiff stated that the joint committee became the agents of
each town; that in the selection and employment of sn officer
of such character there was an implied condition which
authorized dismissal, if circumstances arose which rendered
him no longer able or fit to perform the duties; and that
where a superintendent was under indictment for adultery, it
was competent for the committee to declare that he had become
unfit to continue in that position.
Frye vs. School Committee of Leicester, 500 Mas3. 357 (1938) —
This case was the result of a petition for a writ of mandamus
in the Supreme Court, filed by Marjorie J. Frye, a former
teacher in the public schools of Leicester to effect her re-
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instatement to her former position.
The issue depended
on whether or not she had acquired the status of tenure
She began work in September, 1933, and taught regularly*
organized classes for three of the seven daily periods
^***^**S tbat year.
She was reelected for the years 1934—
1935, 1935-1936, and 1936-1937.
The school committee claimed that because her last
election took place on May 6, 1936, before the final ex¬
piration of her third consecutive school year, she had
not served "for three previous school years” as required
by statute, and that because she was originally employed
as a "part time" teacher from September, 1933, to March,
1934, the time from September to March could not be in¬
cluded ss a part of the three consecutive school years.
The Supreme Court pointed out, in ordering the peti¬
tioner reinstated to her former position, that the statute
recognizes no separate classification of "part time"
teachers, the sole test being "service for the three pre¬
vious consecutive school years", and that a teacher must
be deemed on tenure at discretion when he has actually
served three consecutive school years, and has been elected
for further service, even though the election has taken
place before the expiration of the last three consecutive
school years.
Craves vs. School Committee of Wellesley, 299 Mass. 60
(1937) ~-- The petitioner, S. Monroe Graves, sought a writ
o mandamus to compel the school committee of Wellesley
to reinstate him to his former position as Superintendent
of Schools.
He had been employed in that position since
1914 and in 1935 was holding the position on tenure.
In
July, 1935, the committee asked the petitioner to resign
but he refused.
In October, 1935, the committee wrote the
petitioner urging him to resign before the expiration of
the current school year which would occur in June, 1936.
In February, 1936, the committee at a meeting stated that
they could no longer wait for his resignation, that candi¬
dates for his position had been interviewed, and that
another had already been appointed to succeed him.

t

Early in March, 1936, the petitioner was notified that
it was the intention of the respondents to v^te at a meet¬
ing to be held on April 7, 1936, that his employment would
be terminated on July 31, 1936.
The petitioner, on March 12,
1936, requested a statement of the charges.
Under date of
April 1, 1936, the chairman of the committee sent the
petitioner a letter stating the charges, one of which was
"the failure to create and maintain the school system as one
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conslstent whole.” The petitioner answered
stating that the reasons given were too general and re¬
quested specifications of details as to which his work had
been unsatisfactory.
This request was refused but the
chairman of the school board stated that in order to assist
«
t0„better understand some of Its charges it
might be added:
The findings of the Survey Committee respecting (a) the lack of proper sequential order of study in
the schools . . . surely reflect conditions which have ex¬
isted in our schools with your sanction over a period of
years. ...”
Hearings were held by the committee on April 13 23
26, 1936,
0n APril 27> 1936, the school board vAted
that the petitioner be dismissed as of July 31, 1936.
The
committee called no witnesses and produced no evidence in
support of the charges and they called no witnesses and pro¬
duced no evidence to substantiate the charges.
The petition¬
er introduced much evidence in his behalf.
In sustaining the petition, the Supreme Court stated
that there W8s no compliance with section 42 in that no
evidence had been disclosed on the record which warranted a
dismissal of the petitioner, no one of the charges had been
substantiated, and there had been no judicial Investigation.
The Court stated further that nothing can be treated as
evidence which is not introduced as such and that disbelief
of testimony is not the equivalent of evidence in support
of the charges produced by the school committee.
Houghton vs. School Committee of Somerville, 506 Mass. 542
11940) — Fernell B. Houghton, a former teacher in the
public schools of the City of Somerville, petitioned the
Supreme Court for reinstatement to her position.
The petitioner was discharged with the reason given
that it was the policy of the school committee that the best
Interests of the school will be served by the elimination of
married women teachers as evidenced and declared by a rule
of the school committee.
The rule provided that the marriage
of a permanent teacher should "operate as an automatic re¬
signation”; that no married woman should thereafter be
elected as a permanent teacher; and that ”No married woman
now in the service shall hereafter be employed as a perma¬
nent teacher . . • except one who proves to the satisfaction
of the school committee that she is living apart from her
husband. ...”
The petitioner argued that the rule of the committee
was not the embodiment of an educational policy, and that
the committee had gone beyond its true functions and had
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set up an arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination on pure¬
ly economic and not educational grounds against two differ¬
ent groups of married women.
The court, in dismissing the petition, held that the
rule was within the policy making power of the school com¬
mittee and was not unconstitutional on the ground of dis¬
crimination, as employment "at discretion" was always subject
to the policy-making powers of the committee, to such rules
as they might adopt in pursuance of these powers, and to the
power of dismissal expressly set forth in the governing:
statute itself.
The court further ruled, in answer to allegations of
the petitioner, that the school committee’s hearing was not
illegal because held in the evening or because the petition¬
er’s case was not reached until 10:15 o’clock; also that the
- petitioner was dismissed by a "two-thirds vote of the whole
committee" as required by statute and that there was no re¬
quirement in the statute that the making of rules determin¬
ing questions of policy shall be by a two-thirds vote, even
though the operation of such rules may almost inevitably
result in some dismissals.
Knowles vs. City of Boston, 78 (12 Gray) Mass. 559 (1859) —
This case was an action of contract brought by CharlotteM.
Knowles against the City of Boston to recover salary as a
teacher in a public school in Boston for the quarter ending
December 1, 1855.
The plaintiff was for several years an assistant teacher
in Smith School, having been elected annually by the school
committee, and received her salary quarterly for all services
rendered by her before the first of September, 1855.
On
that day she entered on a new year of service in the same
school and continued in that service until September 14,
1855, when the school was abolished by the committee, and the
plaintiff notified that her services were no longer required.
She was dismissed for no fault ^r direlection of duty on her
part, but solely in the judgment of the school committee the
public interest required that the school should be abolished.
The plaintiff demanded payment of the sum sued for,
after December 1, 1855, and before bringing action.
The de¬
fendants offered to be defaulted for a proportional part of
the salary to the time of the plaintiff's dismissal, and
the parties submitted the case to the decision of the Superior
Court who gave judgment for the plaintiff for the sum offered.
The plaintiff appealed.
The case then went to the Supreme
Court.

\
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In affirming the judgment of the Superior Court, the
Supreme Court said:
’’The facts in the case show that the
mode of selection of teachers by the city was to make
choice of them annually, and that they usually continued
in employment in pursuance of such election for the en¬
suing year.
But such an employment, in the absence of
express stipulation, must be deemed to have been entered
into under the provisions of the statute, which gave the
right to the school committee to terminate it at any time.’’
McDevitt vs. School Committee of Malden, 298 Mass. 215
(1957) —
John W. McDevitt petitioned the Supreme Court
for a writ of mandamus to compel the school committee of
Malden to reinstate him to the position of principal at the
required salary.
On December 17, 1935, while the petitioner was serv¬
ing on tenure as a teacher in the Malden school system, the
school committee elected him ’’Principal of the Lincoln
Junior High School and the Lincoln Elementary School” to
begin work on January 10, 1936.
He was voted a salary of
$3000 for the junior high school and $300 for the elementary
s chool•
On January 6, 1936, after a city election had brought
about a change in the personnel of the board, the new board
voted that ’’the Superintendent be instructed not to recog¬
nize” the vote of December 17, ’’inasmuch as it does not con¬
form with section 59, chapter 71 of the General Laws of
Massachusetts and that the position be declared vacant.”
That section provides that superintendents of schools "shall
recommend to the committee teachers, textbooks, and courses
of study.”
The court, in dismissing the petition, stated that the
school committee had general charge of schools, that the
general managerial powers of the school committee continued
to exist after December 17, 1935, that those powers in¬
cluded the power to change by a majority vote the duties of
teachers on tenure at discretion and to assign them new duties,
or to continue them in their existing duties, or to return
them to duties formerly performed, that a principal is merely
a teacher who is entrusted with special duties of direct on
and management, and that the purpose and result of the second
vote were merely to continue the petitioner as a teacher in
the performance of the same duties performed before December
17, 1935, an act which was within the power of the school
committee to carry out.
The court stated further that the fact
lty
if the committee were mistaken in their belief that
5ecember 17 vote was invalid because the superintendent had
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not recommended the petitioner, that belief was not the
dominating reason for the vote of January 6; and that the
petitioner was not entitled to the increase in salary as
it is not the intent of section 43 of chapter 71 to protect
a ”salary” the right to which never became vested.
Moran vs. School Committee of Littleton, 317 Mass. 591
(1944) ~ John Geddes Moran, a teacher serving at the
discretion of the school committee In Littleton, having
been removed from his position as principal of the high
school of that town after a public hearing upon charges
preferred by the committee, appealed from an order of the
Superior Court dismissing a petition for a writ of mandamus
which he brought to secure his reinstatement.
During the hearing before the committee, two of the
three members who constituted the committee testified under
oath as witnesses, and were examined by counsel for the
petitioner. Each of them after testifying resumed his
duties as a member of the committee.
Nothing in the record
indicated that the petitioner had objected to the procedure,
but in the petition he contended that by becoming witnesses
they were thereby disqualified to act further as members
and that the decision in which they participated was void.
On this point the Supreme Court said that the general
rule is that a member of an administrative board who is
biased or prejudiced against one on trial before the board
is not required to withdraw from the hearing if no other
board can hear and determine the matter, especially if his
withdrawal would deprive the board of the number of members
required to take a valid affirmative vote.
The court also said that the fact that two of the three
members testified under oath as witnesses and were crossexamined by counsel for the teacher, did not disqualify t e
two from resuming their functions as members of the committee and participating in its decision as the plain facts
of justice required them to disclose the f®0*;® th®^
knew if they intended to consider them with the other testi¬
mony.
"Even in the absence of such a statutoryjprovision,
a decision made in a quasi-judicial proceeding by an administrative board based on evidence known only to members of
the board is a nullity.1’
Tn answering to the objection of the petitioner conin answering
J ,
affidavits at the hearing
cerning the introduction of six al*^av;^* * vlts are not
before the committee, the court said.
statements
competent evidence to Prove the truth of^the j^ements^

law^unlesa“they"come°withln some established exception to the
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hearsay rule.
Members of a public board are frequently unskilled in lav/ and rules governing admissability of evidence in courts cannot be expected to be rigidly enforced
in hearings before such boards. We think that the better
rUl^4.iS
issues of fact affecting substantiated rights
ought not to be decided on affidavits, especially if the
method of proof can be avoided.
"We think that one has no just ground for complaint
because an administrative board in conducting a hearing of
charges against him has permitted the introduction of hear¬
say evidence when he has failed to shnw that the other evi¬
dence was not adequate to support the conclusion reached by
the board.
The burden was on him to prove that the decision
resulted in a substantial injustice to him. That does not
appear on this record.
"The order that judgment be entered dismissing the
petition must be affirmed."
Paquette vs. City of Fall River, 278 Mass. 172 (1952) —
This case, found for the defendants in each case, was con¬
solidated in the Superior Court from the cases of Lillian J.
Paquette vs. City of Fall River, and Alvin A. Gaffney vs.
same.
The plaintiffs, teachers in the public schools of Fall
River brought actions of contract against said city to re¬
cover sums of money equivalent to 8 reduction in salary they
received by a vote of the school committee "to reduce
salaries of all teachers by an amount equal to twenty per¬
cent, effective April 1, 1931, excepting those who have not
been employed for more than three years and who have not been
elected to serve at the pleasure of the committee.” The
plaintiffs were serving at the discretion of the school com¬
mittee.
The Supreme Court stated that the word "grade” in
section 43 is designed to include all public school teachers
employed in a particular municipality, regardless of the
name of the school in which the service may be rendered.
"The word * grade1 is broad enough also to comprise tenure
of office."
"Clearly, identity of salary is not the sole test in
determining 1 same salary grade'.
It is only ^ne factor in
determining whether specified teachers are 'of the same
salary grade*•
In deciding whether a general salary re¬
vision affeGts all teachers 'of same salary grade1, consid¬
eration must be given not only to salary received, but also
to the sum of the factors comprehended within the scope of
'grade'.
Two teachers, one having a contract for one year
only and the other having a continuous and indeterminate
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service, cannot rightly be said to be in the same salary
grade even though receiving identical sums as salary.”
vs. Mayor of Fall River, 253 Mass. 590 (1925) —
Lester M.Pecknam filed a petition in the Supreme Court on
April 22, 1925, for a writ of mandamus directing the mayor
and commissioners of the reservoir commission of Pall River
to reinstate the petitioner ”in his employment as ox driver
in the reservoir department. ...”
The petitioner was appointed to his position under
civil service on April 27, 1923, and was employed until
July 12, 1924, when he was suspended without notice and with¬
out a hearing although there was work to be done of which
he was capable of doing and willing to do.
A single justice ordered the petition dismissed. Ex¬
ception by the petitioner to this order brought the case
to the full court.
The court in reversing the order of the
single justice and sustaining the exception brought out
that the petitioner could be dismissed only in the manner
pointed out in sections 43 and 45 of chapter 31 of the
General Laws which entitles a petitioner to a hearing, and
that if the petitioner had brought this petition immediately
after his suspension, he would have been entitled to relief;
consequently his delay from the date of his suspension to the
date of petition does not bar relief nor constitute neglect.
Perkin3 vs. School Committee of Quincy, 315 Mass* 47 (1943) —
P. Gladys Perkins, teaching on tenure in the public schools
of Quincy, was notified that she was to be dismissed.
On
November 26, 1940, a hearing was held before five of the
seven members of the school committee, at which time evi¬
dence was presented by the city solicitor for the City of
Quincy, and by counsel for the petitioner. After the close
of the evidence, arguments of counsel were heard by the five
members of the school committee present.
On December 10, 1940, the entire committee consisting
of seven members voted on her dismissal, the vote being six
for dismissal and one member voting present.
Two of the
members who voted for dismissal were not present at the
hearing on November 26, 1940, when evidence was taken and
arguments of counsel made.
They did not hear any of the
testimony, or see any of the witnesses.
They read the entire
stenographic transcript of the evidence, and the arguments
of counsel, before the meeting of December 10.
*

Miss Perkins petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ
of mandamus commanding the respondent to restore her to the
position of a teacher in the public schools of Quincy.
The
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case was transferred to the Superior Court where the judge
found the facts as stated in the auditor1s report and re¬
ported it to the Supreme Court for determination.
In ordering the petitioner returned to her position
the court stated:
"The fundamental question for decision
is whether the dismissal of the petitioner was made in
accordance with the statutory requirement that ’no teacher
. . • shall be dismissed unless by a two-thirds vote of
... the committeeT read in the light of other requirements
of the statute, particularly the requirement for a hearing
* before the school committee1 of the nature described In the
statute.
The judge ruled ’as a matter of law these two
members /“Prout and BurginJ/ were not qualified to vote on
the ... dismissal, and since their vote cannot be counted,
there was not a two-thirds vote of the committee as re¬
quired by law.’
This ruling was right.
A teacher has not
had the hearing that the statute requires if a committee’s
vote for dismissal is dependent upon the vote of a member
who has not participated in the statutory hearing.”
Sweeney vs. School Committee of Revere, 249 Mass. 525
$1924) ~ Two petitions were filed in the Supreme Court,
the first being for a writ of mandamus directing the respon¬
dents to reinstate the petitioner, LeRoy E. Sweeney, as
principal of the junior high school of Revere and the second
to reinstate William F. Pollard as assistant principal of
the senior high school in Revere, both at their former
salaries of #2762.50 and #2600 respectively.
The facts In the case were that both petitioners had
served on tenure in their positions for a number of years
and that on May 22, 1923, the offices of principal of the
junior high school and assistant principal of the senior
high school in Revere were abolished through consolidation
of the two schools on a vote by the school committee.
Sweeney and Pollard were to be retained as teachers at #2500
each.
There was no evidence of the superintendent’s recom¬
mendation that the positions should be abolished, or that
the petitioners should be dismissed from their respective
positions; nor did it appear that any economic reasons, nor
want of competency and efficiency of the petitioners
actuated a majority of the committee by whom the vote appear¬
ed to have been passed without any notice by the committee
to the petitioners of their intended vote.
In the case of Pollard the court stated:
"The record
clearly showed that the votes of Murray and Reilly, two
members of the committee, were actuated by feelings of poli¬
tical resentment and ill-will more or less openly expressed
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and exhibited.
The votes were not cast upon the merits
of the question, whether the position held by Pollard
should be abolished, in the Interest of public welfare,
but were cast as a convenient means of displacing him
because of his political views, which did not appear to
have been improperly expressed.
The full committee con¬
sisted of seven members with two voting negative to the
change.
If Murray*s and Reilly’s votes were discounted,
the vote would fail of the necessary two-thirds for the
change.
We do not consider that we are required to allow
such a board to nullify the plain and salutory provisions
of section 42 by simply covering their unlawful acts with a
virtuous name.
The committee to whose attention section 42
had been expressly called by one of the members could not
do indirectly that which It could not do directly.
Pollard
could not be dismissed as assistant principal of the high
school unless he received the customary thirty days notice,
as it was found that under the consolidation the adminis¬
trative duties of the principal of the combined schools
would be so Increased that the position of assistant prin¬
cipal at least would be as essential as It was before such
reorganization.”
In the case of Sweeney, the court .said:
"The auditor’s
report indicates that the petitioner had not been dismissed
through personal hostility and that the abolishment of the
principalship of the junior high school was not illegal.
Consequently the votes of Murray and Reilly in Sweeney’s
case could not be Impeached.
The effect of this vote on the
salary of Sweeney Is not within section 43 because he was
the only person of his class.”
The Supreme Court sustained Pollard’s petition, re¬
instating him to his former position with costs.
In
Sweeney’s case the petition was dismissed.
Pulvino vs. Town of Yarmouth, 286 Mass. 21 (1954) -In
this case the plaintiff, Joseph Pulvino, brought action of
contract against the towns of Yarmouth, Dennis, and Brewster
to recover salary alleged to be due him under a contract
of employment as supervisor of music in the schools.
The
action went before the Supreme Court upon Pulvino*s exception
to an order from the Superior Court directing a verdict for
the defendants.
Pulvino was employed as Supervisor of Music In the
towns of Yarmouth, Dennis, and Brewster, said towns being
joined in a superintendency union.
The plaintiff was noti¬
fied by letter under date of September 1, 1931, on a form
of ^phe "School Committee of Yarmouth” that he was elected
a regular teacher in the public schools of the three towns
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for the term of one year at a salary of $1600 from
September, 1931, to June, 1932, and assigned to the Music
Supervisorship School.
This letter was signed ”Superintendent of Schools for the Committee of Yarmouth.”
The
plaintiff began work and was paid every two weeks.
At a joint meeting of the school committees of the
three towns held December 9, 1931, the superintendent re¬
ported dissatisfaction with the plaintiff.
The meeting
voted unanimously that the superintendent be authorized to
make a substitution. Within a few days the superintendent
asked the plaintiff to resign.
Later the three towns voted
separately to authorize the superintendent to notify Mr.
Pulvino that his services were discontinued as of December 31,
1931, by action taken on December 9, 1931.
Another teacher
was elected.
r

The Supreme Court, in overruling the exceptions and
sustaining the verdict of the Superior Court, said:
"There
was no contract made which was binding on the defendants,
followed by an illegal breach, as there was no evidence that
the plaintiff was elected by the joint committee.
If we
were to assume that he ever was elected a teacher, he would
still be unable to show wrongful action in his discharge.
It has long been the law that a school committee could dis¬
charge a teacher at any time.”
Reed vs. School Committee of Deerfield, 176 Mas3. 475 (1900) —
William A. Reed petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of
mandamus to the school committee of the Town of Deerfield and
to Chester M. Barton, commanding them not to interfere with
the petitioner in the performance of his duties as superin¬
tendent of schools in the district composed of the towns of
Deerfield, Hatfield, and Leverett.
The case was heard before
a single justice of the Supreme Court who reported it for
the consideration of the full court.
At a meeting of the joint committees on April 7, 1900,
the convention organized and proceeded to the business of
^electing a superintendent of schools.
For the purpose of
equalizing the vote, the group agreed unanimously that be¬
cause the Deerfield group consisted of nine members, seven
of whom were present, and the other groups consisted of
three members each that the vote of each member from Deerfield
should count three-sevenths of a vote, giving the seven
members from Deerfield three votes, the same as each of the
other towns.
, A formal ballot was taken and Chester M. Barton re¬
ceived four and five-sevenths votes, while Frank Kennedy
received four and two-sevenths votes.
The chairman de-
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dared that there had been no election, and the meeting
adjourned until April 21, 1900.
Barton had been serving
the union as superintendent for five consecutive years
prior to 1900 and continued to serve to the time of the
filing of the petition in this case.
On April 21, 1900, at the adjourned meeting of the
joint committee attended by three from Leverett, three
from Hatfield, and eight from Deerfield, it was voted to
rescind the vote at the previous meeting, seven voting in
the affirmative, six in the negative.
In voting again for
a superintendent, it was agreed unanimously that each
member from Leverett and Hatfield should have three votes,
and each from Deerfield should have one vote.
A formal
ballot was then taken and the petitioner, William A. Heed,
received twelve votes and Barton eleven votes.
The chair¬
man declared the petitioner elected, and no objection was
made thereto.
Upon this ballot, thirteen votes were cast,
seven members voting for Barton, of whom two were from
Hatfield and five were from Deerfield, and six voting for
the petitioner, of whom three were from Leverett and three
from Deerfield, and one member cast a blank ballot.
The petitioner was informed of his election as super¬
intendent, and he accepted the position.
On April 26, 1900,
he began his duties, but on May 7, 1900, he received a
notice from the Deerfield committee that they should recog¬
nize Barton as superintendent.
In sustaining the petition, the Supreme Court said:
"At the first meeting, the respondent. Barton, was elected
and should have been declared elected by the chairman;
however, this was not done and the meeting was adjourned
and at the adjourned meeting it was voted to rescind the
vote of the previous meeting. We are of the opinion that
it was within the power of the meeting to rescind its vote.
Rinaldo vs. School Committee of Revere, 249 Mass. 167
(19365" --' Clara Rinaldo filed a petition for a writ of
mandamus in the Supreme Court to compel the school committee
of the City of Revere to reinstate her to her former posi¬
tion as a teacher in the public schools of that city.
The
case was heard by a single justice of the Supreme Court
who found material facts and reported the case for determina¬
tion to the full court.
The petitioner, after serving as a teacher in the
public schools of Revere for three consecutive school years,
was reelected in 1930 and thereafter served at the dis¬
cretion of the school committee.
In 1927 the school com¬
mittee adopted a rule that ”it shall be inserted in the
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contract of every woman teacher that marriage of a teacher
shall terminate her contract, even if on tenure.”
In
1929 the committee adopted a second rule that "marriage of
a woman teacher . . . shall operate as an automatic resig¬
nation of said teacher, and this regulation shall apply
to teachers on tenure."
The petitioner was well aware of the committee’s
policy in this respect, as her contracts contained express
stipulations to the above mentioned rules, to which she
had assented.
In June, 1935, she married.
In the follow¬
ing September the committee would not permit her to teach,
and on November 12, 1935, after a hearing in accordance with
section 42 of chapter 71 of the General Laws, the committee
dismissed her, the "causes" stated as being her "violations"
of the terms of her contract as a teacher and the rules here¬
inbefore mentioned.
There was no evidence of bad faith on
the part of the committee.
The Supreme Court said in dismissing the petition:
"The primary question to be decided is whether, if a school
committee has adopted a policy forbidding the employment
of married women teachers, the marriage of a woman teacher
can be found to be ’good cause* for dismissal under General
Law, chapter 71, section 42 which, in its present form as
amended by Statute 1934, chapter 123, provides that a teacher
employed at discretion ’shall not be dismissed, except for
inefficiency, incapacity, . . .’
We think the answer must
be in the affirmative.
"If the cause is at least fairly debatable and is
asserted honestly, and not on subterfuge, that is enough.
Whether or not married women should teach in public schools
is a matter about which there may be an honest difference
of opinion. We need not elaborate the possible arguments.
"The statutory power was in fact followed.
Insistence
upon remaining a teacher after marriage could be termed a
violation of the second rule if not the first.
The super¬
intendent did give the committee his recommendation as re¬
quired by the statute.
It was in substance that the com¬
mittee take action to enforce its regulations."
Sheldon vs. School Committee of Hopedale, 276 Mass. 250
(1931) -- This case resulted from a petition to^ the Supreme
Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the school committee
of Hopedale to reinstate the petitioner, Elba Sherburne
Sheldon, as a teacher in the public schools of the town.
The petitioner, then unmarried, was elected a teacher
in Hopedale on July 12, 1922.
She went on tenure in 1925.
On May 20, 1930, the school committee unanimously voted to
Instruct the superintendent of schools to "eliminate from
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our teaching force female married teachers.”
This vote
was taken without prior specific recommendation in regard
thereto by the superintendent.
At that time there were
four married female teachers in the schools; one a part
time music instructor.
On May 26, 1930, the petitioner
was informed by the superintendent of the vote of May 20,
and was invited to resign.
This she refused to do.
Since
May 20, two of the four female married teachers had re¬
signed, and the fourth, the music supervisor, was reelected
to continue her work.
On September 8, 1930, the superintendent recommended
to the committee the dismissal of Mrs. Sheldon.
On
September 10, 1930, the committee decided to vote on the
dismissal on October 14, 1930 and notified her of their
intended action previous to thirty days prior to its in¬
tended action.
She requested a hearing and a statement of
reasons for dismissal.
The reason given for dismissal was
the belief of the committee that "the best interest of the
schools would be served by eliminating married women from
the teaching force.”
A hearing was held on October 14, 1930,
and the petitioner was dismissed by a vote of the committee
on the same date, following the hearing.
The case was heard by a single justice of the Supreme
Court who found that the petitioner had married in 1928
on the assurance that her position would not be affected.
The music supervisor was continued in employment because it
was difficult to secure a part time teacher and because the
committee did not consider her a regular teacher.
The
committee acted throughout in good faith and in the belief
that the rule was of benefit to the schools.
He ordered
the petition dismissed.
The petitioner excepted and the
case went before the full court for a decision.
The full court, in sustaining the rule of the single
justice and ordering the petition dismissed, said:
”A
decision that wise administration of public schools calls
for the elimination of women teachers if they are married
is not so irrational that it is inconsistent in law with
good faith in dealing with dismissal.”
Toothaker vs. School Committee of Rockland, 256 Mass. 584
(19261 — Oliver K. Toothaker petitioned the Supreme Court
for a writ of mandamus to compel the school committee of the
town of Rockland to reinstate him to his former position as
superintendent of schools.
The petitioner had been employed on tenure in his
position, having been employed since September, 1921.
One
of the three members of the school committee, Mr. Easton,
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was elected to his post In March, 1924* During that year
he was the only member of the three not satisfied with
the petitioner's incumbency.
In March, 1925, another member
Mr. Ford, was elected to the committee.
He too was un¬
favorable to the petitioner.
In fact the outstanding issue
of the campaign for election in 1925 was the dismissal of
the superintendent.
On April 28, 1925, the secretary of the committee
notified the petitioner by letter that "on June 17, 1925,
a vote of the school committee will be taken on the question
of your dismissal ..."
The petitioner requested a hear¬
ing and reasons for the proposed vote.
On the morning of
June 17, 1925, Mr. Easton called the third member of the
committee, Mrs. Hayden, who was favorable to the petitioner
stating that the petitioner desired a hearing, and that a
special meeting would be held that afternoon.
She gave her
consent to the hearing but did not attend the special meet¬
ing and had no knowledge that the question of grounds upon
the proposed vote was to be taken. When she learned of the
narration of grounds at the evening meeting, she "protested
the whole proceeding."
At the evening meeting the petitioner attended with
witness.
Also present were the three committee members,
a stenographer, and counsel for Easton and Ford.
At the
meeting Easton and Ford stated that the grounds for their
proposed action were:
"1. Lack of harmony and cooperation
between the committee and Superintendent which is detri¬
mental to the welfare of the schools.
2. It Is believed
that we can obtain and maintain a higher standard ...
with the assistance of some other Superintendent than your¬
self."
The vote was delayed until June 25, 1925, because of
graduation exercises at the high school.
On that date the
committee voted to dismiss Mr. Toothaker by a vote of two
to one.
The esse was referred to an auditor and later heard
by a single justice of the Supreme Court who denied the
petition. The petitioner took exceptions and the case went
to the full court which upheld the decision of the single
justice who stated:
"The notice of intention to vote on
removal was sufficient.
The special meeting of June 17
was legal as there was no evidence of fraudulent conceal¬
ment.
There was no illegality in the attendance of counsel
for the members of the school committee at tne session on
June 25.
...
"The vote to dismiss the petitioner was valid. Upon
the evidence of the report to the auditor, I am unable to
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conclude that the action of the members of the committee
was dictated solely by personal ill will.
The votes of
the town had no binding or legal effect to control the
action of members of the committee; but they could con¬
sider in deciding what was for the welfare of the schools
the feeling of large numbers of the citizens towards the
supe r1nte nde nt.
"Dealing with the matter as one of discretion, I
do not feel that one whose usefulness as a superintendent
is so doubtful in view of the circumstances disclosed by
the evidence, should be retained in office by this court;
even though his ability and willingness to render good
service to the schools of Rockland are as great as, from
the evidence, I believe them to be, and although his dis¬
missal is so likely to be a cause of regret to the committee
and town."
Wood vs. Inhabitants of Medfleld, 125 Mass. 545 (1878) —
In an action of contract against the town of Medfleld,
Cornelius E. Wood attempted to recover $150 alleged due to
him as unpaid salary as a teacher in the public schools
of Medfleld.
The case first went before the Superior Court
without jury.
The plaintiff1s contract for the year 1873-1874 was
signed with the understanding that he teach for the year
and was for $1200.
The school committee voted to close the
school on May 29, 1874, and discharged the plaintiff.
They
notified him that his services were no longer required but
gave no reason for their action.
•»

Wood objected to the action of the committee on the
ground that they had no right to deprive him of his salary,
except for some incapacity, or misconduct or other breach
of contract.
The judge ruled otherwise and ordered judg¬
ment for the defendant.
The plaintiff alleged exceptions
and the case went to the Supreme
Court.
In overruling the exceptions, the Supreme Court stated
that there was no authority in law by which a school com¬
mittee can bind a town to pay for the services of a teacher
after he shall have been discharged by the school committee
acting under its obligations of duty.
Opinion of the Attorney General, Volume 5, Page 422 (1919) —
In a letter to the Commissioner under date of December 3,
1919, the Attorney General said:
"You have requested an opinion on the following propo¬
sitions:_
‘Can a joint school committee, acting in December of
this year, elect a superintendent of schools for a three
year term to begin July 1, 1920?’
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’Can said committee elect a superintendent of schools
to serve temporarily; that is, from January 1, 1920, to
July 1, 1920?’
"The law relating to this subject is incorporated in
Revised Laws, chapter 42, section 44, as amended by Statute
1911, chapter 384, section 1, and is as follows:
’The joint committee shall annually, in April, meet
at a day and place agreed upon by the chairman of the com¬
mittees of the several towns comprising the union and shall
organize by the choice of a chairman and secretary.
They
shall employ a superintendent of schools, determine the rela¬
tive amount of service to be performed by him in each town,
fix his salary, apportion the amount thereof to be paid by
the several towns and certify it to each town treasurer.
Such superintendent of schools shall be employed for a term
of three years, , and his salary shall not be reduced during
such term.*
"This law relates to the selection of a superintendent
of schools by the joint school committees of school unions,
and is not specific on the points about which you inquire.
”It is my opinion that a superintendent must be employ¬
ed for a three year term, regardless of when employment
begins•"
Opinion of the Attorney General (1938) Page 28 — The follow¬
ing opinion was in answer to a question concerning the status
of teachers on tenure in the City of Pittsfield, resulting
from a proposed revisior in the city charter:
’’Said statute of 1932, chapter 280, section 37, provides
in effect that teachers shall be appointed only for terms not
in excess of one year.
This provision is entirely inconsis¬
tent with the terms of General Law, chapter 71, relative to
the election of teachers ’to serve at its /~the school com¬
mittee* s_7 discretion’, as the quoted words are used in
chapter 71, sections 41 and 42.
As used in said sections 41
and 42 the phrases ’serve at discretion’, ’to serve at dis¬
cretion* and ’employed at discretion’ connote employment not
for a period with a fixed and definite maximum length, but for
an. indefinite period.
Hence the provisions of said General
Law, chapter 71, sections 41 and 42, with relation to the
tenure of teachers who are chosen to serve at discretion, have
no application to teachers who are appointed annually, as
those functioning under the newly adopted charter of Pitts¬
field are to be.
In other words, the terms of said section
41 and at least the second sentence of section 42, are render¬
ed ineffective as to the teachers of Pittsfield by the
passage and adoption of said Statute 1932, chapter 280, when
it becomes fully effective as described in its section 46.
’’Teachers have no vested interest in the tenure of
their offices that the same may not be altered or destroyed
by an act of the Legislature, so that teachers elected prior
to the passage of said chapter 280 will be in no different
case than others after the act becomes effective in this
respect.”
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